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ARTICLE
A FALL FROM GRACE: UNITED STATES V. W.R.
GRACE AND THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY REFORM
Beth Brennan* & Andrew King-Ries**
This Article examines several 2009 cases involving prosecutorial
misconduct arising from the government's failure to live up to its crimi-
nal discovery obligations-e.g., United States v. Theodore Stevens,
United States v. Ali Shaygan, and United States v. Jones. The Article
focuses specifically on United States v. W.R. Grace, a Clean Air Act
criminal case in Montana, where the court found the government had not
fulfilled its discovery obligations and imposed a harsh remedy in spite of
finding that the prosecutors' failures did not rise to the level of
prosecutorial misconduct. While commentators have long argued that
the lack of an enforceable pretrial disclosure obligation undermines fair
trials from defendants' point of view, the authors' analysis of Grace, Ste-
vens, and other cases suggests that the absence of a clear, enforceable
rule also jeopardizes the government's ability to fairly prosecute its
cases. Nonetheless, the Department of Justice has consistently opposed
amending Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 to require prosecutors
to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant before trial. This resis-
tance exacts high costs on individual prosecutors as well as the public at
large. The government's narrow interpretation of its disclosure obliga-
tions will inevitably conflict with trial courts' broad interpretation of the
government's duties, primarily because courts consistently interpret
prosecutors' legal duties in light of their ethical duties. For these rea-
sons, the Article supports amending Rule 16 to eliminate the gap between
prosecutors' legal and ethical duties, and to require the pretrial disclo-
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who co-taught the class with them. The Authors are grateful to Prof. Carl Tobias of the Uni-
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this Article.
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sure of evidence favorable to the defendant. The Article concludes by
encouraging the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to once again
make such a recommendation to the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
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"It has taken many disturbing experiences over many years to erode this
court's trust in the Department of Justice's dedication to the principle
that 'the United States wins . . . whenever justice is done one of its
citizens in the courts.' "'
INTRODUCTION
When Judge Emmet Sullivan "exploded in anger"2 over federal
prosecutors' failure to turn over documents responsive to post-trial dis-
covery motions in United States v. Theodore Stevens,3 shock waves re-
verberated throughout the federal criminal justice system. Judge
Sullivan held four Justice Department attorneys in contempt that day,
I United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 184 (D. Mass. 2009) (referring to the
inscription on the U.S. Department of Justice building in Washington, D.C. that was
mentioned in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963)).
2 Nedra Pickler, Justice Dept. Lawyers in Contempt for Withholding Stevens Docu-
ments, WASH. POST, Feb 14, 2009, at A7.
3 Senator Ted Stevens's federal conviction was dismissed after an investigation revealed
exculpatory and impeachment evidence had been wrongfully withheld from the Senator. See,
e.g., The Ted Stevens Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, at A18, available at http://on-
line.wsj.com/article/SB123863051723580701.html.
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calling it "outrageous" that the government would ignore his explicit
court order.4 He dismissed Senator Stevens's conviction in response to a
request by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, who replaced the Stevens
prosecution team and then learned the original team had withheld even
more exculpatory and impeachment evidence from the senator than origi-
nally thought.5 Judge Sullivan's appointment of an independent special
prosecutor to determine whether six of the Stevens prosecutors had en-
gaged in criminal behavior during and after trial indicated his lack of
trust in the disciplinary office of the Department of Justice. 6 He deliv-
ered a "lacerating 14-minute speech"'7 from the bench, in which he
warned of "a 'troubling tendency' he had observed among prosecutors to
stretch the boundaries of ethics restrictions and conceal evidence to win
cases."8 Judge Sullivan subsequently submitted a request to the Advi-
sory Committee on Federal Criminal Rules asking it to amend Rule 169
to require the government to disclose all information favorable to the
defense regardless of materiality,10 and submitted a request to the chair
of the D.C. District's Rules Committee to consider a similar amendment
to the D.C. District's local rules."
Judge Sullivan's anger over the government's consistently coy re-
sponses to his orders to disclose Brady materiall 2 in Stevens resurrected
an issue that the Standing Committee on Rules and Practice had carefully
4 Joe Palazzolo, Judge Holds Prosecutors in Contempt in Stevens Case, BLT: THE
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 13, 2009, 6:09 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/02/
judge-holds-prosecutors-in-contempt-in-stevens-case.html; Nedra Pickler, Ted Stevens' Prose-
cutor to be Held in Contempt, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2009/02/13/ted-stevens-prosecutor-ton_1 66813.html.
5 See Carrie Johnson & Del Quentin Wilber, Holder Asks Judge to Drop Case Against
Ex-Senator, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2009, at Al.
6 Del Quentin Wilber, Judge Orders Probe of Attorneys in Stevens Case, WASH. POST,
Apr. 8, 2009, at Al [hereinafter Wilber, Attorney Probe]. Although disciplinary complaints
are usually handled by the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility,
Judge Sullivan said "he had no faith in such an internal investigation after seeing so much
'shocking and disturbing' behavior by the government." Id.
7 Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8,
2009, at Al.
8 Id.
9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
10 Letter from the Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of Columbia, to the
Hon. Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure 1 (Apr. 28, 2009), available at Federal Rulemaking, Comments & Suggestions,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CR%20Suggestions
%202009/09-CR-A-Suggestion-Sullivan.pdf [hereinafter Sullivan Letter to Tallman].
11 Letter from the Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, U.S. Dist. Judge, Dist. of Columbia, to the
Hon. Henry H. Kennedy, Chair, of Columbia Rules Committee 1 (Dec. 7, 2009) available at
http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2009/12/LettertoKennedyl.pdf.
12 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[Sluppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.").
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tabled over two years earlier,13 and has sent ripples throughout the crimi-
nal justice system, which may lead, finally, to criminal discovery reform.
This would not be possible were the ground not already fertile for
such change. Several federal district judges last year found that U.S.
Attorneys committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose ex-
culpatory or impeachment evidence to defendants. A federal judge in
Florida publicly reprimanded the prosecuting attorneys for withholding
impeachment evidence from defendant Dr. Ali Shaygan, and awarded the
defendant $600,000 in attorneys' fees after he was acquitted of 141
charges of illegally distributing drugs. 14 A Massachusetts federal judge
dismissed gun charges against a defendant' 5 upon learning that the prose-
cutor withheld impeachment evidence and ordered the prosecutor and the
Massachusetts U.S. Attorney to show cause why they should not be sanc-
tioned.' 6 In the District of Columbia, a federal judge reprimanded prose-
cutors for withholding impeachment evidence of a prosecution witness in
a trial charging seven defendants with kidnapping a U.S. citizen in
Trinidad. 17
The trial court judges in each of these cases found prosecutorial
misconduct based on the prosecutors' failures to disclose obviously ex-
culpatory or impeachment evidence to the defense.18 The Stevens prose-
cutors doctored documents, shepherded a witness back to Alaska upon
learning he had exculpatory information in his possession, and consist-
13 See Sullivan Letter to Tallman, supra note 10, at 1.
14 United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009). The
attorneys' fees were awarded under the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 105-119, Tit. VI,
§ 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2159 (1964) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964)) which authorizes
the "award to a prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and
other litigation expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was
vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make
such an award unjust." The district court's award of sanctions under the Hyde Amendment is
on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Appellant Andrea Hoffman's Notice of Appeal, United
States v. Shaygan, No. 08-20112-Cr-Gold (April 22, 2009).
15 See United States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (D. Mass. 2010). The defendant
was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, a conviction that would have carried
a mandatory ten-year term.
16 United States. v. Jones (Jones II), 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 165-66 (D. Mass. 2009);
United States. v. Jones (Jones 1), 609 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115, 131 (D. Mass. 2009).
17 See Jordan Weissmann, Prosecutors in Kidnapping Case Rebuked over Brady, BLT:
THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMEs (June 24, 2009, 2:04 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/
06/prosecutors-in-kidnapping-case-rebuked-over-brady.html. The United States citizen,
Balram Maharaj, eventually died while in captivity. Id.
18 The constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense was first
articulated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963). See infra Part I for a more
thorough discussion of prosecutors' legal obligations to provide favorable information to crim-
inal defendants.
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ently lied to the court about what they had done.19 The Shaygan prose-
cutors directed two prosecution witnesses to secretly record
conversations with defense counsel in an attempt to disqualify Shaygan's
lawyers, and did not reveal to the defense that the witnesses were confi-
dential informants for the government. 2 0 The Jones prosecutor did not
disclose to the defendant that the key police witness had told her more
than once that he did not recognize the defendant on the night of the
crime. 21 Finally, the attorneys prosecuting the hostage-taking of Balram
Maharaj in Trinidad failed to disclose FBI agent notes stating one of the
defendants led the agents to the wrong place when they asked to be taken
to the mountain hideaway where the victim was being held captive. 22
The temptation in high-profile cases involving outrageous
prosecutorial misconduct is to focus on individual prosecutors and con-
clude the problem lies with their knowledge, their experience, or their
character. 23 While each of those flaws may exist, it is equally plausible
that the prosecutors are part of a larger culture that provides them with
contradictory guidance 24 and creates expectations that cannot consist-
ently be met. 25  Trial courts and prosecutors use similar words and
phrases in discussing the government's disclosure obligations, but often
19 See Senator Stevens' Motion to Dismiss the Indictment; or in the Alternative, Motion
for a New Trial, Discovery and an Evidentiary Hearing at 4-8, United States. v. Stevens (No.
08-cr-231-EGS) (Dec. 22, 2008); Wilber, Attorney Probe, supra note 6.
20 United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1290-91 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
21 Jones 1, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 116. Because the court noted another inconsistency in the
government's evidence at the suppression hearing, it ordered the prosecutor to review her
notes. Id. at 117. She did so, and sent a copy to the court for an ex parte in camera review. Id.
That same day, she said she did not find anything that merited disclosure; the court disagreed,
noting several inconsistencies. Id. at 117-18. At that point, the notes were turned over to the
defense. Id. at 118.
22 Weissmann, supra note 17. This kind of evidence does not on its own prove or dis-
prove anything; however, it is impeachment information that could be used by the defendant.
23 This is reflected in judges' decisions to refer prosecutors to disciplinary offices. See,
e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976) (stating that prosecutors are protected
from § 1983 liability by absolute immunity); see also Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evi-
dence, 22 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 833, 933-34 (1997) (suggesting that prosecutors be individ-
ually liable for damages caused by their failures to disclose exculpatory information).
24 Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Con-
victions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 Wisc. L. REv. 399, 400 (arguing that
prosecutorial misconduct results in large part from vague ethical rules, vast discretionary au-
thority, and inadequate remedies for the misconduct).
25 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 488
(2009) ("Brady's failure ultimately rests with the materiality requirement itself, not just the
prosecutors who must apply it."); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional
Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643, 651-52 (2002). Prof.
Sundby contends that an ethical prosecutor with true Brady material should not turn the evi-
dence over, but should dismiss the charges. Id.
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mean entirely different things. 26 Courts focus on the principles animat-
ing the obligation, 27 while prosecutors focus on the lines over which they
may not cross28-lines measured only in hindsight.29
Thus, while some prosecutors may flout the spirit as well as the
letter of the law, even those who intend to fulfill their legal obligations
may interpret those obligations more narrowly than do trial courts.
When a judge orders the government to turn over evidence favorable to
the defense within a certain time period, the government likely interprets
the order in light of its own guidance manual30 and hears, "Turn over
admissible evidence that is exculpatory or impeaching if it is likely to
affect guilt or punishment, in time for the defendant to make effective
use of it at trial." This interpretation of the government's disclosure obli-
gations is not unreasonable; it hews closely to the rules established by a
line of Supreme Court cases. 3 ' Nonetheless, many trial judges have
higher expectations of the government than is strictly required by the
Supreme Court. Those expectations are also not unreasonable, grounded
as they are in principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in ethical rules
governing prosecutors and in trial judges' own charge to safeguard "the
26 United States v. Naegele, 468 F. Supp. 2d 150, 152 (D.D.C. 2007) ("At the outset, the
Court notes that too often in criminal cases the prosecution and defense are like two ships
passing in the night when it comes to Brady; they fail to begin with a common understanding
of the Brady decision and what is meant by the government's so-called 'Brady obligation."');
cf Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 531, 531 (2007) (noting that "as interpreted by the judiciary, Brady actually
invites prosecutors to bend, if not break, the rules, and many prosecutors have become adept at
Brady gamesmanship to avoid compliance").
27 See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("Society wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.").
28 See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There is no general constitu-
tional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one; . . . 'the Due Process
Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be af-
forded. . . .'); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995) ("[Tlhe Constitution is
not violated every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might
prove helpful to the defense.").
29 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) ("The evidence is material only if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome."); see also Eugene Cerruti, Through the Look-
ing-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and
Due Process, 94 Ky. L.J. 211, 213 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Cerruti, Through the Looking-
Glass] ("[T]he trial must come first, and the disclosure of exculpatory evidence must come
only after a conviction, if at all.").
30 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5.001 (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousalfoia-reading.room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm [hereinafter,
U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL] .
31 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972);
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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rights of the accused and the interests of the public in the administration
of criminal justice." 3 2
This tension between trial courts and prosecutors boiled over in
United States v. W.R. Grace,33 a 2009 Clean Air Act criminal trial in
Missoula, Montana. There, the government's failure to disclose certain
evidence overshadowed the substantive allegations of wrongdoing
against the defendant and led to an acquittal that may reflect the jury's
judgment of the government vis-A-vis its discovery obligations more than
it does its judgment of the defendants' guilt or innocence. Grace is em-
blematic of the chasm that has developed between federal district judges
and prosecutors over the government's criminal discovery obligations.
Even in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct, discovery obligations
based on a materiality standard that is applied only in retrospect are al-
most as difficult for prosecutors to comply with as they are for trial
judges to enforce. 3 4
The Grace trial did not set out to be a cautionary tale about criminal
discovery. In 2005, W.R. Grace and seven of its executives were in-
dicted for knowingly endangering the townspeople of Libby, Montana
through ongoing releases of asbestos related to Grace's now-defunct ver-
miculite mine.35 The scourge of Libby asbestos is well-known; the EPA
sent an Emergency Response Team to Libby in 1999 to investigate the
health risks posed by a unique form of asbestos that occurs naturally in
the vermiculite ore and is released into the air upon the slightest distur-
bance. 36 As a result of this research, Libby was designated a Superfund
site in 2002.37 Nearly 2,000 current or former Libby residents have de-
veloped asbestos-related diseases; Libby residents have died from asbes-
tosis at a rate 40-60 times higher than expected; more than 200 have died
of asbestos-related diseases.3 8
32 AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF
THE TRIAL JUDGE § 6-1.1(a) (3d ed. 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/stan-
dards/specialfunctions.pdf.
33 445 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (D. Mont. 2006).
34 Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass, supra note 29, at 243-46. Professor Cerruti
opines that the Brady doctrine has been so subverted by subsequent decisions narrowing its
applicability that it perversely creates the very culture of withholding that Judge Sullivan and
other district court judges are railing against. Id. at 230-43. From Professor Cerruti's vantage
point, the gap between trial courts and prosecutors' understanding of the government's disclo-
sure obligations logically follows from the Supreme Court's Brady jurisprudence. Id. at 243.
35 Superseding Indictment, paras. 39-45, United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d
1122 (D. Mont. 2006) (CR-05-07-M-DWM).
36 See id. paras. 37-38.
37 Libby was placed on the National Priorities List in 2002. See Region 8, Libby Site
Background, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region8/
superfund/libby/background.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
38 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 35, paras. 47-59. Another report mentions
that the rate is actually forty to sixty times higher. See ExPOSURE INVESTIGATION & CONSUL-
TATION BRANCH, DIVISION OF HEALTH ASSESSMENT & CONSULTATION, AGENCY FOR TOXIC
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As the Grace trial opened in Montana in February 2009, it promised
an archetypal theme of good guys finally bringing bad guys to justice.
The government alleged that the defendants knew that the asbestos from
the vermiculite was deadly,39 that workers were developing lung disease
from exposure to tremolite, the unique Libby asbestos,40 that Grace
workers were dying from these diseases,4 1 and that Grace products re-
leased asbestos when used routinely and could not be made safer.42 The
government further alleged that the defendants nonetheless allowed
Libby residents to use the contaminated vermiculite as a base for school
running tracks and the grade school skating rink,43 that they closed the
mine and sold heavily contaminated properties to people who intended to
live, play, and work there without telling them of the danger,44 and that
they then left town having pocketed "at least $140 million in after tax
profits arising largely from products made with vermiculite contaminated
with tremolite asbestos from the Libby Mine." 45
Grace was an easy defendant to hate; the facts alleged by the gov-
ernment in the superseding indictment painted a picture of a company
that had no regard for the collateral human damage that its business
caused.46 While the prosecutors' ability to present evidence was se-
verely limited by a few key rulings on substantive law, what finally
doomed the government's case was its admitted failure to disclose im-
peachment evidence47 regarding its star witness, Robert Locke-a for-
mer W.R. Grace employee who worked in a variety of managerial roles
during his twenty-four-year tenure including positions related to the
Libby mine.48
U.S. District Judge Donald W. Molloy found that the government's
discovery violations did not rise to the level of prosecutorial miscon-
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, HEALTH CONSULTATION: MORTALITY FROM AsBESTOSIS IN
LIBBY, MoTr., 1979-1998 (2000), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/hac/pha/pha.asp?
docid=1225&pg=0.
3 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 35, paras. 74-76, 84-88.
40 See id. paras. 76, 92, 96-102.
41 Id. paras. 103-04.
42 See id. paras. 115-27.
43 Id. paras. 24-26.
44 See id. paras. 28-35.
45 Superseding Indictment, supra note 35, para. 46.
46 W.R. Grace was also a defendant in other high-profile environmental contamination
cases, including the contamination of public water supplies in Woburn, Mass. See JONATHAN
HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (Vintage 1996).
47 See generally Gov't's Consol. Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Dismissal Due
to Prosecutorial Misconduct, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (April 25,
2009), available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtd/images/1124.pdf (admitting that the
United States was guilty of committing discovery violations).
48 Ryan, Thompson, Robert Locke, UM GRACE CASE BLOG, http://www.umt.edulgrace-
case/exibit-32/expert-witnesses/robert-locke/. Locke sued the company for unfair treatment
after his departure in 1998. Id.
A FALL FROM GRACE
duct 49 but held that the prosecutors had breached their constitutional and
statutory duties to disclose favorable information to the defense.50 As a
remedy, the court allowed the defendants to cross-examine Locke a sec-
ond time on a narrow scope of issues, prohibited the government from
redirect examination, and instructed the jury that the Locke was back on
the stand because the government had not lived up to its legal
obligations.5'
In its jury instruction, the court made some powerfully negative
statements about the government. 52 In a lengthy instruction read to the
jury prior to Locke's re-cross, the court stated, inter alia, that "the De-
partment of Justice and the United States Attorney's Office have violated
their constitutional obligations to the defendants, they have violated the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and they have violated orders of
the Court."53 The court advised the jury to "examine Locke's entire tes-
timony with great skepticism and with greater caution than that of other
witnesses." 54 Although the judge did not mention the defendants in his
instruction, the implication was clear: if the prosecutors were the bad
guys, the defendants must be the good guys. His unusual prohibition on
redirect made it difficult for the government to recover. The verdict of
acquittal two weeks later was not much of a surprise, and was not
appealable.55
In contrast to the findings of prosecutorial misconduct in other high-
profile cases-Stevens, Shaygan, and Jones56-the Grace court made an
explicit finding of no prosecutorial misconduct under the current legal
standards.57 The court suggested instead that the prosecutors had not
49 Order at 9, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (Apr. 28, 2009) [herein-
after 2009 Grace Order I].
50 Id. at 8.
51 Id. at 11-14.
52 Jury Instruction, U. S. v. W.R. Grace, No. CR-05-07-M-DWM (Apr. 28, 2009). See
infra Appendix 1 for the complete text of this instruction.
53 Id. at 2.
54 Id. at 3.
55 The government may have been able to file an interlocutory appeal of the judge's
remedy, but it did not do so.
56 See infra Part I for a more in-depth discussion of these cases.
57 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 9. Prosecutorial misconduct based upon a
failure to disclose material evidence to the defense requires proof of three elements: that the
withheld evidence was favorable to the accused or could have impeached a prosecution wit-
ness, that the government knew of the evidence but did not disclose it, and that the suppression
of the evidence prejudiced the defendant. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S 668, 691 (2004). As
discussed infra notes 101-104, any prejudice is cured if the defendant is able to cross-examine
the witness regarding the withheld evidence. Thus, the government's failure to disclose evi-
dence in a timely fashion will never amount to prosecutorial misconduct because the defendant
will not be able to prove that he was prejudiced.
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lived up to their ethical obligations58 and expressed serious concern for
the ability of the defendants to obtain a fair trial. 59 These concerns led it
to impose severe trial sanctions that virtually assured the defendants of
an acquittal.60
This is what makes Grace a paradigmatic story. High-profile cases
draw attention to egregious acts of particular prosecutors; Grace draws
attention to the predictable consequences of a system that lauds high
principles but enforces them only in hindsight. Prosecutors push the lim-
its of an obligation that is not meaningful except in the breach, defend-
ants push for more discovery by relying on lofty language touting the
principles of fair trials and a just society, 61 and trial courts look for law
to apply so that they can ensure the fair and orderly administration of
justice.
The Grace trial epitomizes the need for criminal discovery reform.
Specifically, criminal discovery rules need to be amended to close the
gap between prosecutors and courts, and between legal and ethical rules.
Only in this way can the criminal justice system take an important step
toward its central mission of doing "justice." With prosecutors feeling
58 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 9. Prosecutors have an ethical duty to "make
timely disclosure to the defense all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 3.8(d). However, ethical violations by government attorneys may not provide a basis
for a private remedy:
The principles set forth herein . . . are intended solely for the guidance of attorneys
for the government. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to
create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party to
litigation with the United States, including criminal defendants, targets or subjects of
criminal investigations, witnesses in criminal or civil cases . . . and shall not be a
basis for dismissing criminal or civil charges or proceedings or for excluding rele-
vant evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
28 C.F.R. § 77.5. In addition, prosecutors are immune for their actions "associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (ex-
tending common-law immunity for prosecutors to § 1983 liability when prosecutor is acting as
an advocate); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858-59 (2009) (holding that Imbler
immunity extends to prosecutors' failure to disclose Giglio material).
59 See 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 51, at 10-14. While every criminal defendant has
a constitutional right to a fair trial, the right is not amorphous; it is measured and enforced
under interpretive rules established by the Supreme Court. In the case of a defendant's right to
a fair trial being undermined by the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence, the right is
measured by the materiality standard established in Brady and Bagley, i.e., through a finding
of prosecutorial misconduct. Ethical violations are to be referred to the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel for investigation and possible punishment.
60 Given the sprawling and complex nature of the government's case, it is unclear
whether it could have obtained any convictions even in the absence of the court's jury
instruction.
61 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("Society wins not only when the guilty
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice
suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."). Defense attorneys routinely request Brady
material.
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the brunt of the chasm between vague legal rules and lofty ethical obliga-
tions-both individually and as representatives of the people-reform
may finally be possible. 62
Part I of this Article discusses the gap between the legal and ethical
rules relating to prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, it describes the
web of overlapping duties governing prosecutors as they decide whether
to provide certain information to defendants before and during trial and
highlights the contradictions between prosecutors' and trial courts' inter-
pretations of the government's discovery obligations. Part II discusses
recent high-profile cases in which courts have wrestled with instances of
prosecutorial misconduct involving failure to disclose exculpatory and
impeachment information. Part III tells the story of United States v. W.R.
Grace, and the evolution of the court's and parties' expectations regard-
ing the government's discovery obligations over the four years from in-
dictment to acquittal. Part IV analyzes the Grace court's resolution of
the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct surrounding the govern-
ment's failure to disclose impeachment evidence regarding its star wit-
ness, Robert Locke. This Part concludes that while the Grace court
intended to correct a perceived unfairness, its interpretation of Brady was
broad, and its jury instruction and prohibition on redirect were punitive.
Part V discusses the need for reform of the criminal discovery rules.
This Part analyzes current efforts underway to close the gap between
prosecutors' legal and ethical obligations, and recommends amending
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 as the most direct route to achiev-
ing this goal.
I. THE LEGAL & ETHICAL CONTEXT
"[I]f no one knew about Brady before Stevens, everyone does
now, .. ."63
A complicated web of interrelated statutes and cases governs the
prosecution's duty to disclose evidence to the defense. Federal Rule of
62 One of the two reasons given by the Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules for the Standing Com-
mittee's decision not to approve the Advisory Committee's proposed amendments to Rule 16
was that there were "questions whether a need for the change had been sufficiently shown."
Advisory Comm. On Criminal Rules, Minutes, U.S. COURTS, 2 (Oct. 2007), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%2Part%201.pdf. The sec-
ond stated reason was a concern that the government would be required to disclose information
that is not "material," which is the central point of conflict between trial courts and the govern-
ment. Id. See infra Part L.A for an in-depth discussion of materiality in the criminal discovery
context.
63 Transcript of Oral Argument in Motion Hearing at 16, United States v. Zhenli Ye Gon
(D.D.C. Jun. 2, 2009) (No. 07-181).
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Criminal Procedure 16 creates a limited obligation of disclosure.64 The
Jencks Act requires the government to provide witness statements to the
defense, but not until after the witness has testified on direct examina-
tion.65 Brady requires the government to turn over exculpatory evidence
to the defense,66 and Giglio obliges the government to turn over evidence
that could be used to impeach a prosecution witness. 67 Under both
Brady and Giglio, the information must be disclosed only if it is "mate-
rial." 68 The U.S. Attorney's Manual (USAM) establishes guidelines for
federal prosecutors that rely on the materiality standard69 and encourage
prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure. 70 Finally, the ethical rules
governing lawyers prescribe specific rules for prosecutors in regards to
their disclosure obligations, as well as an overarching duty to do
justice.7'
A. The Government's Constitutional Duties to Disclose
To those who litigate in the civil arena, criminal discovery-or the
lack thereof72-iS surprising and confusing.73 Brady protects a defen-
dant's due process rights74 and seeks to ensure that the defendant re-
ceives a fair trial.75 The key elements of a Brady claim are: (1) the
64 See FED. R. CRIM. PROc. 16; see also infra notes 111 to 114 for a more detailed
explanation of this rule.
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (2006).
66 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963).
67 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972).
68 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
69 U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-5.001.
70 Id. § 9-5.001(B)(1) ("Recognizing that it is sometimes difficult to assess the material-
ity of evidence before trial, prosecutors generally must take a broad view of materiality and err
on the side of disclosing exculpatory and impeaching evidence.").
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 3.8(d) (2005).
72 "There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did
not create one; . . . 'the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery
which the parties must be afforded."' Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (quot-
ing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)).
73 In the words of former National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers President
Larry Pozner: "If you are fighting about money in America, you can have full discovery of
everything your opponent intends to do to you years in advance of trial. But if you're fighting
for your life, for your liberty, in America, you can get sandbagged every day." Symposium,
Panel Discussion: Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. L. REV. 781, 783 (1999).
74 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[Tjhe suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.").
75 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[T]he prosecutor is not required
to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the
accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial . . . ."); Brady, 373 U.S.
at 87 ("Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair
...1)
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evidence was favorable to the defendant, (2) the government withheld
the evidence willfully or inadvertently, and (3) the evidence was material
to either guilt or punishment. 7 6 The last prong is often referred to in
shorthand as "prejudice" to the defendant.?7 Brady applies whether or
not the defendant makes a specific request for the information.7 8
Although Brady involved evidence withheld by the prosecutor, its
conceptual roots are found in an earlier rule holding that a prosecutor
deprives a defendant of his right to a fair trial when she knowingly uses
perjured testimony. 79 This rule in turn was extended to cases in which
the prosecutor does not suborn perjury, but allows false testimony to
stand uncorrected-even when the testimony goes merely to the credibil-
ity of the testifying witness.80 Brady has been interpreted as applying to
evidence that would only have been used to impeach a prosecution
witness.8 '
Importantly, the government may-and often does-withhold
favorable evidence without committing a "real" violation of Brady.82
The government's failure to disclose evidence rises to a constitutional
violation only if the withheld evidence was material, which is defined as
"a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."8 3 As
explained by the Court, "The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed
information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the
outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional
sense." 84 At the same time, "a showing of materiality does not require
demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evi-
dence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal."8 5
76 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
77 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999).
78 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
79 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1935)
(holding that a prosecutor can deprive a defendant of due process by knowingly using perjured
testimony and withholding favorable evidence)).
80 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 268-70 & n.3
(1959) (reversing conviction where witness falsely testified he was not receiving any benefit
from prosecutor for his testimony, and prosecutor did not correct him)); see also Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957) (per curiam) (testimony "taken as a whole" was seriously
prejudicial to a capital murder defendant, and withheld testimony might have resulted in a
finding of a lesser offense).
81 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
82 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-437 (1995) ("(Tlhe Constitution is not violated
every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to
the defense." (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 & n.7 (1985))).
83 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (adopting the standard for materiality from Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
84 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976).
85 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ("A 'reasonable probability' is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.").
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Similarly, allowing false testimony to stand uncorrected-some-
times known as a Napue violation 86-does not constitute a "real" due
process violation unless the evidence was material.87 The Ninth Circuit
standard is "whether there is 'any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." 88 As the Su-
preme Court has explained, "The question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood
as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." 89 Thus, although
the materiality rule is worded slightly differently, the ultimate inquiry for
both Brady and Napue violations is whether the verdict is "worthy of
confidence." 90
Because materiality is measured by confidence in the verdict, it is
difficult to define the scope of the government's disclosure obligation
before or during trial.91 The prosecution must "make disclosure when
the point of 'reasonable probability' is reached." 92 As Justice Thurgood
Marshall observed in his dissent to Bagley, the Court "defines the right
not by reference to the possible usefulness of the particular evidence in
preparing and presenting the case, but retrospectively, by reference to the
likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial." 93 One
86 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (holding that the state may not allow
false testimony to stand uncorrected, even if the falsity was relevant only to the witness's
credibility).
87 See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057,
1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008); Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
88 Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984 (quoting Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 881-82 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
89 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (quoting Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984).
90 Id.
91 The Court has acknowledged this difficulty:
[T]here is a significant practical difference between the pretrial decision of the pros-
ecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge. Because we are dealing with an
inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of evidence
can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent
prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). At least one commentator disagrees with this
portrayal of the "prudent prosecutor": "The prudent prosecutor will do no such thing. The
Court's use of the word "prudent" here connotes the prosecutor who wants to seal a conviction
and would not engage in behavior that risks the security of that conviction. However, the
Court's holdings have set up exactly the opposite incentive." Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial
Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1133, 1144
(2005).
92 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
93 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Professor Hoeffel contends that this
outcome-oriented materiality standard creates inherent incentives for prosecutors to withhold
evidence: "The Brady standard at trial means that the prosecutor can withhold favorable evi-
dence on the theory it would not have affected the outcome of the trial, knowing this is in fact
what appellate courts usually find in similar circumstances. The ethical rules are not en-
forced." Hoeffel, supra note 91, at 1151.
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scholar has explained why "a literal application of Brady requires little
disclosure from prosecutors":
If a conscientious prosecutor faces exculpatory evidence that would
shake her faith in any conviction she might obtain without the evidence,
then she will presumably dismiss charges against the defendant. . . . On
the other hand, if the exculpatory evidence does not undermine her belief
in the defendant's guilt, she is likely to conclude that the evidence will
not affect the jury's determination either. Accordingly, she would treat
the evidence as immaterial and therefore not within her Brady
obligation. 94
In other words, it is not only possible but predictable that prosecu-
tors will withhold evidence from defendants under the Court's material-
ity standard. As the D.C. District Court has stated, articulating the scope
of the government's pretrial disclosure obligation through a materiality
lens "permits prosecutors to withhold admittedly favorable evidence
whenever the prosecutors, in their wisdom, conclude that it would not
make a difference to the outcome of the trial." 95 One commentator de-
scribes the materiality standard as a prosecutorial privilege "to withhold
exculpatory information until the defendant manage[s] to both discover
and prove, post trial, that the prosecutor's conduct, standing alone, had
probably cost him an acquittal." 9 6
Brady is premised on a core principle underlying our system of gov-
ernment: "[O]ur system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly."9 7 But the Bagley materiality standard chafes
against this lofty principle with its focus on the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence rather than on his ability to prepare for trial.9 8 Not surprisingly,
the juxtaposition of Brady and Bagley leads not only to conflicting inter-
pretations by district courts, but to a constant tension among prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and judges over the actual scope of the government's
disclosure obligations.99
94 Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 INo. L.J. 481, 488 (2009)
(citations omitted).
95 United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005).
96 Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass, supra note 29, at 235-36.
97 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
98 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 n.20 (1976) ("It has been argued that the
standard should focus on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to
prepare for trial, rather than the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence.
Such a standard would be unacceptable for determining the materiality of what has been gener-
ally recognized as 'Brady material."' (citation omitted)). Information that is not disclosable
under Brady may still be discoverable, however. FED. R. CaRni. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) provides that
the defendant be permitted access to items within the government's "possession, custody, or
control" that are "material to preparing the defense," as long as the defendant requests such
items. See United States v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (D. Mont. 2005).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1232 (D. Nev. 2005)
("Brady's concern whether a constitutional violation occurred after trial is a different question
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Trial courts consistently order the government to disclose all excul-
patory and impeachment evidence, but prosecutors routinely withhold
such information, either intentionally or inadvertently. If the failure to
disclose is not discovered prior to the verdict, and the defendant is con-
victed, the appellate court will look at all of the evidence introduced at
trial to determine whether the withheld evidence would have tipped the
scale in the defendant's favor. However, the mere fact that such infor-
mation existed and was not disclosed is insufficient to establish a Brady
violation. A failure to disclose is deemed material only if the exculpa-
tory information might have created reasonable doubt, or if impeaching
information was about a sole or key witness-in other words, cases
where the reviewing court believes that the jury would have reached a
different conclusion had the prosecution presented the evidence it
withheld. oo
In cases of delayed disclosure, where the government should have
disclosed the information earlier but did eventually disclose it, the delay
is not material in the Bagley sense, i.e., the defendant is not prejudiced, if
he can use the information at trial. The ability to use the information
means the ability to conduct cross-examination of the relevant witnesses
and not the ability to defend the case differently.' 0 Thus, if the defen-
dant has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness after the untimely
disclosure is made, any prejudice is cured.102 Dismissal of the indict-
ment is a proper remedy for delayed disclosures only if "less drastic al-
ternatives are not available."103 Even if the defendant is convicted, a
post-conviction finding that exculpatory or impeachment evidence was
improperly withheld does not automatically require reversal.104
A few district courts have held that the proper standard for discover-
ability before and during trial is whether the evidence is favorable to the
than whether Brady is the full extent of the prosecutor's duty to disclose pretrial."); United
States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("[S]uppression of exculpatory
evidence is improper even if it does not satisfy the materiality standard of Brady and result in a
due process violation. Though an error may be harmless, it is still error."); Panel Discussion:
Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781 (1999).
1oo See, e.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 97; Brady, 373 U.S. at 88-89.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Fallon, 348 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555,
560-61 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 665
(6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987); United States v. Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460,
1462 (9th Cir. 1985) (no due process violation where defendant had information at beginning
of trial and made use of it in cross-examination).
102 See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 655-56 (9th Cir.
1988).
103 United States v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1993).
104 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 ("[A] constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be
reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial."); Kearns, 5 F.3d at 1254.
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accused, not whether it is favorable and material. 0 5 They have done so
by distinguishing a post-conviction standard that determines whether a
defendant should receive a new trial from a pretrial and trial standard that
seeks to ensure the fairness of the process as it is occurring. 0 6 If all
courts agreed that this interpretation of the Brady obligation were cor-
rect, there would be no need for criminal discovery reform; however,
several courts and the Department of Justice disagree. 0 7
Thus, the constitutional duty imposed upon the government by
Brady, Giglio, and Bagley is borne of a commitment to the defendant's
right to a fair trial but is circumscribed by a standard that measures viola-
tions of that duty post-verdict, and provides no consistently enforceable
rules to apply before and during trial.
B. Statutory Duties: Jencks Act & Federal Rule 16
In addition to its constitutional obligations, the government has dis-
closure obligations under two federal statutes. The Jencks Act, enacted
in 1957, requires the prosecution to provide statements of its witnesses to
the defense.108 Under the Act, the government must give the defense
copies of a government witness's prior recorded statements that "relate to
the subject matter as to which the witness testified" after the witness
testifies on direct examination and "on motion of the defendant." 109
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (Rule 16) has the potential
to be more useful than Jencks to criminal defendants because it requires
the prosecution to disclose, among other things, any written or oral state-
ments of the defendant including statements of an organizational defen-
dant's agents.1t0 Rule 16 does not impose a blanket rule on the
prosecution to disclose exculpatory or impeaching evidence, although it
does require the disclosure of documents or tangible items "material to
preparing the defense" if the defendant asks for them."' If a party vio-
105 United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) ("The prosecutor cannot
be permitted to look at the case pretrial through the end of the telescope an appellate court
would use post-trial."); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
("[T]he definitions of materiality as applied to appellate review are not appropriate in the
pretrial discovery context .... ).
106 Safavian, 233 F.R.D. at 16; Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 ("[S]uppression of
exculpatory evidence is improper even if it does not satisfy the materiality standard of Brady
and result in a due process violation.").
107 See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 908 A.2d 39, 60 n. 32 (D.C. App. 2006) (disagreeing
with Safavian, 233 F.R.D. at 16); U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-5.001(B)
(The Department of Justice includes materiality as an element of exculpatory or impeachment
information that is subject to disclosure).
08 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2010).
109 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (a)-(b) (2010).
110 FED. R. CRnt. P. 16(a)(1).
I1 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(E)(i). This requires a threshold showing by the defense that
the prosecution is in possession of specific information helpful to the defense; conclusory
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lates Rule 16, the court may order disclosure, grant a continuance, pro-
hibit the introduction of the undisclosed evidence, or "enter any order
that is just under the circumstances."1 2 Rule 16 empowers the court to
control discovery and to sanction any failures of compliance." 3
Efforts to codify Brady have focused on amending Rule 16."4 U.S.
District Judge Emmet Sullivan, who presided over the Stevens trial,
wrote to the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules in April 2009 urg-
ing it to propose once again an amendment to Rule 16 requiring the dis-
closure of all exculpatory information to the defense. 15 The Advisory
Committee made such a recommendation to the Standing Committee on
Rules and Procedure in April 2007; 116 the Standing Committee deferred
consideration of the proposal indefinitely in June 2007.117 In response to
allegations are not sufficient. United States v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (D.
Mont. 2005) (citing United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1995)); United States
v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441, 1450 (D. Colo. 1997)). Judge Molloy suggested in one of his
early discovery orders that the materiality requirement of Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) necessarily in-
cludes Brady material. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076 n.5 (citing the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to 1974 Amendments, Rule 16, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). While
documents and tangible objects that are "material to preparing the defense" are probably also
"favorable to the accused," this interpretation again overlooks the Bagley materiality standard.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985).
112 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (d)(2).
113 "At any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or in-
spection, or grant other appropriate relief." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). The court is empow-
ered to sanction a party's failure to comply with its discovery orders by ordering discovery,
granting a continuance, refusing to admit certain evidence, or "enter any other order that is just
under the circumstances." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
114 Such an amendment has been discussed by the Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules for several years. Advisory Comm. On Criminal Rules, Docket of Suggested Changes to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Considered by the Advisory Committee Since 1991,
U.S. COURTS, 10 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/2010-CRDocket.pdf. Judge Molloy became a member of the Advisory Committee on
Criminal Rules in 2007; his term will expire in 2010. Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules
Members, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CommitteeMember-
shipLists/ST _Roster_2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
115 Sullivan Letter to Tallman, supra note 10, at 1.
116 Advisory Comm. On Criminal Rules, Minutes, U.S. COURTs, 5 (Oct. 2009), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CR10-2009-min.pdf
[hereinafter Minutes]; History of Committees' Consideration of Amendments to Rule 16, Table
of Contents with Summary of Action, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Rule 16 Table of Contents.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Committee's Con-
sideration]. The 2007 proposal arose out of a report issued by the American College of Trial
Lawyers. Amer. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable
Information under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 AM. CRi. L. REv. 93,
Ill (Winter 2004) (proposing a new section to Rule 16 requiring disclosure within fourteen
days of a request of "all information favorable to the defendant" that is known to the prosecu-
tor or any investigating agency, and defining favorability).
117 Committee's Consideration, supra note 116, at 1.
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Judge Sullivan's request, however, the Advisory Committee reconsti-
tuted its Subcommittee on Rule 16.118
The Department of Justice has opposed the proposed amendment
from its inception.119 It advocated in 2006 for the addition of Section 9-
5.001 to the U.S. Attorneys' Manual. 120 It contends that a rule amend-
ment would "unnecessarily upset the careful balance of interests in the
criminal justice process." 121 Specifically, the Department of Justice op-
poses any amendment that "expand[s] disclosure requirements beyond
the dictates of Brady," but it "would not object to amending Rule 16
simply to codify the disclosure requirements of Brady."122 At the Octo-
ber 2009 Advisory Committee meeting, Assistant Attorney General
Lanny Breuer suggested that if the committee wants to amend Rule 16
"beyond the dictates of Brady," congressional action is necessary.1 23
Judge Tallman, chair of the Advisory Committee, noted at the Octo-
ber 2009 meeting the potential conflict between the Jencks Act and a rule
requiring disclosures before trial, as well as the unresolved legal issue of
whether the "supersession clause" would give precedence to the Rules
118 Minutes, supra note 116, at 5. Judge Tallman appointed himself, Judge Morris C.
England, Jr., Prof. Andrew D. Leipold, attorney Rachel Brill, and Assistant Attorney General
Lany Breuer to the subcommittee. Id.
119 Memorandum from U.S. Dept. of Justice (Criminal Division) to Hon. Susan C. Buck-
lew, Chair, Judicial Conference Subcomm. on Rules 11 and 16 (Apr. 26, 2004); FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., TREATMENT oF Brady v. Maryland Material in the U.S. District Courts' Rules, Orders &
Policies: Report to the Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules to the Judicial Conference of the
United States (Oct. 2004), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/bradymat.pdf;
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V. MARYLAND Material in the U.S. District Courts' Rules, Orders
& Policies: Report to the Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules to the Judicial Conference of the
United States 6-7 (May 2007) [hereinafter FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Brady Material], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CRO5-2007.pdf.
120 Minutes, supra note 116, at 5 ("[I]n 2007, the Committee had approved an amendment
to Rule 16, over the objection of the Department of Justice."); Sullivan Letter to Tallman,
supra note 10, at 1.
121 Minutes, supra note 116, at 5.
122 Minutes, supra note 116, at 6. It is not clear what the Department of Justice means by
this. The black-letter rule from Brady is that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Although the term "material" was not fully interpreted
until Bagley, the Department likely means that it supports codification of this requirement but
opposes an amendment that requires disclosure of all information favorable to the defense.
See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1232 (D. Nev. 2005) ("[T]he govern-
ment urges Brady's materiality standard is the limit of the duty to disclose.").
123 Minutes, supra note 116, at 6 (Oct. 2009). This reflects the Department's contention
that any interpretation of Brady that imposes a pretrial disclosure obligation on the govern-
ment impermissibly conflicts with the Jencks Act. Id.; see Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-36
(recognizing that in Ninth Circuit, the Jencks Act trumps Brady, citing United States v. Jones,
612 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 1979), explaining why those conflicts are rare, and proposing a
process to deal with conflicts when they occur).
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Enabling Act' 24 over the statute. 125 He and Judge Lee Rosenthal, chair
of the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, "cautioned that as
a general matter, the rules committees prefer not to rely on the superses-
sion clause, and that committees should strive to avoid conflicts with
statutes wherever possible."' 26
C. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual is an internal guidance manual contain-
ing "general policies and some procedures."1 2 7 It does not create en-
forceable rights and "does not create a general right of discovery in
criminal cases."' 28 In response to the Advisory Committee's decision in
2006 to recommend amending Rule 16 to codify Brady, the Department
of Justice amended the U.S. Attorneys' Manual to include a section pro-
viding direction to prosecutors regarding their disclosure obligations.129
In January 2010, outgoing Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued
a memo providing additional guidance to Department of Justice prosecu-
tors regarding their discovery obligations. 30 Thus, the department poli-
cies regarding the disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment
information are found in Section 9-5.001 and CRM 165, "subject to legal
precedent, court orders, and local rules."'31
In a separate memo announcing the issuance of the January 2010
guidance memo, Mr. Ogden quoted language from Berger v. United
124 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2010).
125 Minutes, supra note 116, at 7.
126 Id.
127 U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 30, § 1-1.100.
128 U.S. ArORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-5.001(E); DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIM.
RESOURCE MANUAL § 165 (Jan. 4, 2010) available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousal
foaireading-room/usam/title9/crmOO165.htm (stating the guidance "is not intended to have
the force of law or to create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits"); accord United States
v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000). Section 9-5.001, "Policy Regarding Dis-
closure of Exculpatory and Impeachment Information," was added in October 2006. See U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-5.100 ("On October 19, 2006, the Attorney General
amended this policy to conform to the Department's new policy regarding disclosure of excul-
patory and impeachment information . . . ."); Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy
Atty. Gen. to Department Prosecutors, (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/
dag-memo.html [hereinafter Ogden Memo].
129 U.S. ATORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-5.001(E).
130 Ogden, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery, supra note 128;
Ogden Memo, supra note 128, at 1. The Department of Justice convened a working group in
response to the extensive discovery misconduct that occurred in Stevens. Joe Palazzolo, Attor-
ney General Promises Judges a New Day at DOJ, NAT'L L.J. (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1202430445215.
131 Ogden Memo, supra note 128, at 2-3 ("With the advice of the Working Group, I have
approached any further revisions to Department policy with the understanding that local prac-
tices and judicial expectations vary among districts, and that a one-size-fits-all approach might
result in significant changes in some districts and no changes in others.").
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States,132 which forms the basis for prosecutors' ethical responsibili-
ties.133 Emphasizing that prosecutors have an obligation to "seek jus-
tice," Mr. Ogden explained all U.S. Attorney's offices have been directed
to develop discovery policies that consider "controlling precedent, ex-
isting local practices, and judicial expectations." 13 4 Mr. Ogden named a
national coordinator for criminal discovery programs, 135 and noted that
each United States Attorneys' Office (USAO) has also named a "discov-
ery coordinator," who will conduct trainings and act as "on-location ad-
visors with respect to discovery obligations."' 3 6 Mr. Ogden promised
continuing action with respect to creating structural support for prosecu-
tors to more easily meet their discovery obligations. 37 Specifically, he
stated that the department will create an "online directory of resources
pertaining to discovery issues," a "Handbook on Discovery and Case
Management," and "a pilot case management project to fully explore the
available case management software" to ensure that information from
law enforcement files is more readily available to prosecutors.138 He
also stated that the Department will implement discovery training pro-
grams for paralegals and law enforcement agents and "[r]evitalize the
Computer Forensics Working Group" to better determine how to store
and catalogue information.139
The Department is relying on these actions to convince the Advi-
sory Committee that Rule 16 does not have to be amended.140 In his
October 2009 presentation to the Advisory Committee on Criminal
Rules, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer differentiated
prosecutorial misconduct from prosecutorial error by stating that the for-
mer, resulting from knowing and intentional conduct, "can only be recti-
fied by robust enforcement and sanctions" and will not be cured by a
broader duty to disclose.14 1 He contrasted that with prosecutorial error,
which he contended is susceptible to improvement through "training,
guidance, strong leadership, and more uniformity." 42
132 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
133 See Ogden Memo, supra note 128, at 2.
134 Id. at 2-3.
135 Andrew Ramonas, DOJ Names New Criminal Discovery Coordinator, MAINJUSTICE
(Jan. 15, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/01/15/doj-names-new-criminal-
discovery-coordinator/.
136 Ogden Memo, supra note 128, at 3.
137 See id. at 3-4.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See Minutes, supra note 114, at 6 ("[Tlhe Department remained opposed to amending
Rule 16 to expand disclosure requirements beyond the dictates of Brady.").
141 Id. at 5.
142 Id. at 6.
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One member of the Advisory Committee stated at the October 2009
meeting that it was important that the Department be held "accountable
for assessing and reporting the effects of the 2007 changes to the Man-
ual, since the changes had essentially functioned as an alternative to
amending the rule." 143 Although no formal assessment has been done,
the Department has made noteworthy contentions to at least one court.144
In July 2009, the government submitted a brief to Judge Emmet Sullivan
in response to his request for briefing on whether the government's delay
in disclosing to defendant Zhenli Ye Gon that a key witness against him
had recanted was a Brady violation.' 45 Paul O'Brien, the chief of the
Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section,146 stated in his brief that Brady
violations cannot occur if the government disclosed the exculpatory in-
formation in enough time for the defendant to make effective use of it at
trial.147 More importantly, Judge Sullivan had inquired of the govern-
ment how its actions comported with the USAM, which creates a disclo-
sure obligation "broader than the Constitution itself requires."148 In his
brief, Mr. O'Brien responded by quoting Section 9-5.001(E), which
states that the manual "does not create a general right of discovery in
criminal cases" nor "provide defendant with any additional rights or rem-
edies." 49 Mr. O'Brien stated: "Instead, the manual is strictly a matter of
Department of Justice policy, and any possible failure to comply with it
is therefore a matter of internal concern." 50 In other words, for those
who believe that current problems with criminal discovery may be trace-
able to the unenforceability of a pretrial disclosure obligation and the
substantial discretion given prosecutors to determine materiality,1'1 the
143 Id. at 8.
144 Second Supplement to the Gov't's Motion to Dismiss, at 12-13, United States v.
Zhenli Ye Gon, (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 07-181).
145 Id. at 1-3.
146 Paul O'Brien led the department's investigation into the withholding of evidence in
Stevens. Joe Palazzolo, Is Emmet Sullivan Brady-Crazy?, MAINJUSTICE (June 25, 2009, 6:16
PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/06/25/is-judge-sullivan-brady-crazy/. Mr. O'Brien
appeared on behalf of the Department of Justice before Judge Sullivan in April 2009 when the
Stevens indictment was dismissed upon the government's motion. Mary Jacoby, O'Brien: We
at DOJ "Deeply Regret" Mistakes in Ted Stevens Case, MAINJUSTICE (Apr. 7, 2009), http://
www.mainjustice.com/2009/04/07/obrien-we-at-doj-deeply-regret-mistakes-in-ted-stevens-
case/.
147 Second Supplement to the Gov't's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 144, at 3.
148 Id. at 12.
'49 Id.
150 Id.; Joe Palazzolo, Hypothetical Brady Ain't Real Brady, DOJ Says, MAINJUSTICE.
(July 14, 2009), http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/07/14/hypothetical-brady-aint-real-brady-
justice-department-says/.
151 At least two members of the Advisory Committee expressed concern about relying on
prosecutors rather than judges to determine materiality of exculpatory or impeachment infor-
mation. Minutes, supra note 116, at 7.
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U.S. Attorneys' Manual is unlikely to provide an effective alternative to
the status quo.
D. Local Rules
The District of Massachusetts pioneered the use of local rules to
create an enforceable disclosure obligation on the government. 152 The
rule defines exculpatory information'5 3 and imposes deadlines by which
such information must be produced. 15 4 According to the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC), in 2007, thirty-seven of the ninety-four federal judicial dis-
tricts reported having a local rule, standing order, or procedure governing
the disclosure of Brady material.155 Whether those districts experience
fewer problems with criminal discovery is an open question; the Com-
mittee has asked the Federal Judicial Center informally study this and
report its findings to the Committee. 15 6
The 2007 FJC report describes the variation among districts in their
local rules, standing orders, and procedures.' 5 7 The districts vary in their
description of the information that must be disclosed, whether disclosure
is automatic, the timeframe within which information must be disclosed,
and whether the disclosure obligation is continuing.15 8 No district speci-
fies sanctions for prosecutors' violations of the rules, leaving it instead to
the discretion of the court.159
152 LR, D. Mass. 116.2, available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/pdf/com-
bined01.pdf; United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169-70 (D. Mass. 2009) (including
Chief Judge Mark Wolf's explanation of the development of the local rules regarding criminal
discovery).
153 LR, D. Mass. 116.2(A):
Exculpatory information includes, but may not be limited to all information that is
material and favorable to the accused because it tends to: (1) Cast doubt on defen-
dant's guilt as to any essential element in any count in the indictment or information;
(2) Cast doubt on the admissibility of evidence that the government anticipates offer-
ing in its case-in-chief, that might be subject to a motion to suppress or exclude,
which would, if allowed, be appealable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731; (3) Cast doubt
on the credibility or accuracy of any evidence that the government anticipates offer-
ing in its case-in-chief; (4) Diminish the degree of the defendant's culpability or the
defendant's Offense Level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
154 See id. R. 116.2(B).
155 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Brady Material, supra note 119, at 7.
156 Minutes, supra note 114, at 7-8. The Federal Judicial Center reported to the Advisory
Committee in April 2010 that it was preparing a survey of federal judicial districts to assess the
need for an amendment to Rule 16. Advisory Comm. On Criminal Rules, Minutes, U.S.
COURTS, 7 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Minutes/CR2010-04-min.pdf.
157 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Brady Material, supra note 119.
158 Id. at 8. For example, some districts require disclosure of "favorable information,"
others refer to "Brady information," and others use the term "exculpatory information." Id.
159 Id.
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E. The Ethical Context
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct specify the "special re-
sponsibilities" of a prosecutor,160 which were gleaned from the oft-cited
1935 Supreme Court decision in Berger v. United States.16' One of
those special responsibilities is "to seek justice, not merely to con-
vict."1 6 2 As one scholar has observed, "If the adversarial trial remains a
boxing match, at least the prosecutor must fight by the Marquis of
Queensbury rules and avoid striking below the belt."' 63 As the represen-
tative of the people armed with the power of the sovereign, the prosecu-
tor is held to a higher standard than other lawyers:
The United States Attorney . . . may prosecute with ear-
nestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from im-
proper methods calculated to produce a wrongful convic-
tion as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about
a just one.164
Specifically, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require pros-
ecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or infor-
mation known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigates the offense."' 65 In other words, the ethical rules not
only exhort prosecutors to observe their higher calling, they mandate dis-
closures that are favorable even if they are not material.
The trial court is also governed by ethical obligations. The ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice state:
160 MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1983). U.S. Attorneys practicing in fed-
eral court are governed by the district's local rules as well as the state's ethical rules for
attorneys. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 77.3 (2009). Attorneys practicing in the
Montana federal courts are governed by the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct as well as the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct. D. Mont. L.R.
83.13.
161 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obliga-
tion to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.").
162 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-1.2(c), at 4 (3d ed. 1993),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/prosecutionfunction.pdf.
163 Stephanos Bibas, The Story of Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship
Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 131 (Carol Steiker
ed., 2006), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/bibas-brady.pdf
164 Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (1935).
165 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1983); Morrr. R. PROF'L CONDUCT
3.8(d) (2004).
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The trial judge has the responsibility for safeguarding
both the rights of the accused and the interests of the
public in the administration of criminal justice. The ad-
versary nature of the proceedings does not relieve the
trial judge of the obligation of raising on his or her initi-
ative, at all appropriate times and in an appropriate man-
ner, matters which may significantly promote a just
determination of the trial. 166
One of the important roles that trial judges play in the criminal jus-
tice system is protector of the process and, consequently, protector of
defendants. This is illustrated by the ABA Standards for trial judges
which state that "[t]he trial judge has the responsibility for safeguarding
both the rights of the accused and the interests of the public in the admin-
istration of criminal justice."'6 7 As noted by Judge Learned Hand:
A judge, at least in a federal court, is more than a moder-
ator; he is affirmatively charged with securing a fair
trial, and he must intervene sua sponte to that end, when
necessary. It is not always enough that the other side
does not protest; often the protest will only serve to em-
phasize the evil. Justice does not depend upon legal dia-
lectics so much as upon the atmosphere of the court
room, and that in the end depends primarily upon the
judge.168
This principle is captured in comments made in late 2009 by white-
collar criminal defense attorney Brendan Sullivanl 69 after U.S. District
Judge Cormac Carney dismissed with prejudice an indictment against
William Ruehle, the former CFO of Broadcom because of government
misconduct:
[W]hen I was a young lawyer, I was naive and I thought
that fairness was assured in our courtrooms because our
founding fathers had devised this magical constitution
and this magical bill of rights, and somehow if the gov-
ernment lived by that, that we would always be just fine.
166 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 6-1.1(a), at 13 (3d ed. 2000).
167 Id.
168 Brown v. Walter, 62 F.2d 798, 799-800 (2d Cir. 1933). It was also Learned Hand
who said that criminal defendants do not deserve all of the government's evidence. See United
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950).
169 Mr. Sullivan has represented many high-profile defendants over the forty-plus years of
his practice, including Lt. Col. Oliver North, Henry Cisneros, and most recently, Senator Ted
Stevens. Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr. Biography, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, http://www.wc.com/
attorney-BrendanSullivan.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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But I was naive. I learned in short order that the only
thing that assures fairness in the courtroom are judges
with courage to keep their eyes open, watch what is hap-
pening, keep an open mind and make fair decisions, fair
to both sides. 70
II. STEVENS, SHAYGAN, AND JONES: HIGH PROFILE FINDINGS OF
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Our system of government embodies the belief that a structured set
of rules, applied equally to everyone, is not just the best way to create a
free society but the only way.171 When rules are clear, every party to a
proceeding can make informed decisions. However, when rules sound
like they are clear but the law supporting those rules is enforceable only
in the breach, prosecutorial decision-making becomes a guessing game
involving predictions of how the trial will unfold and what information
will be revealed.172 Moreover, the trial court's discovery orders are in-
terpreted in the context of this larger guessing game, as that determines
the materiality of exculpatory or impeaching evidence. Thus, a trial
court's orders to disclose "favorable information" may be interpreted as
"material information," sometimes subverting the trial court's explicit
intentions.
District court judges work daily within the constraints of the law;
they apply law that has been created by appellate courts, legislatures, and
executive agencies. They know their decisions are subject to review by
other judges who will be coolly detached from the courtroom, the parties,
the lawyers, and the jury. District court judges know that many of their
decisions will be determined to be in error by judges who have more
time than they do to make a decision. That is the nature of the trial
court's world-a world about which few trial judges complain.
Judges who have taken the unusual step of publicly advocating for
criminal discovery reform have done so because they are angry and frus-
trated.' 73 In Stevens, for example, Judge Sullivan appointed a special
170 Transcript of Proceedings at 5203, United States v. Ruehle, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2009)
(No. SACR 08-00139-CJC).
171 See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (discussing rules of disclosure,
liberty, and the demands of justice).
172 This is how the gamesmanship of Brady disclosures develops. See Gershman, supra
note 26, at 533, 548-50.
173 Judge Emmet Sullivan is the most recent judge to publicly call for an amendment to
Rule 16. See supra text accompanying notes 2-11. However, Chief Judge Mark Wolf, of the
District of Massachusetts, was one of the earliest crusaders for criminal discovery reform. The
story of Chief Judge Wolf's experience can be found in several of his opinions. See United
States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009); Barone v. United States, 610 F. Supp. 2d
150 (D. Mass. 2009) (open letter to newly appointed U.S. Attorney General, Eric Holder,
explaining Chief Judge Wolf's history and frustration with criminal discovery); Ferrara v.
A FALL FROM GRACE
prosecutor to investigate the prosecutors who withheld impeachment in-
formation from Senator Stevens. 17 4 More recently, in United States v.
Gon,175 Judge Sullivan dismissed an indictment with prejudice because
of the length of time that had passed between the key government wit-
ness's recantation and the disclosure of that recantation to the defense.17 6
In Shaygan, Judge Gold awarded the defendant $600,000 in attorneys'
fees under the Hyde Amendment,177 referred the prosecutors to the Of-
fice of Professional Responsibility, and publicly reprimanded the U.S At-
torney and his senior staff, the assistant U.S. attorney in charge of the
narcotics division and her deputies, and the two lead prosecutors. 17s
Similarly, the Grace court was not angry merely because the gov-
ernment had not disclosed information it should have; it was angry be-
cause it perceived an unfairness in the process that it felt obliged to
correct.179 Its remedy was unusual both in terms of the extensive com-
ments made in the jury instruction and in the prohibition on redirect,180
but unusual remedies are becoming more commonplace as judges grow
increasingly frustrated by prosecutors who fail to disclose exculpatory or
impeachment information in spite of clear orders to the contrary.
Judge Wolf of Massachusetts has also struggled with an appropriate
remedy for a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information that
was discovered in time to prevent prejudice to the defendant. 18' Under
United States, 384 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Mass. 2005). Chief Judge Wolf was a member of the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules from 2005 to 2008. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 171 n.6.
Chief Judge Wolf was also involved in establishing the Office of Professional Responsibility,
the disciplinary arm of the Department of Justice. Palazzolo, supra note 130.
174 See, e.g., The Ted Stevens Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009, at A18.
175 No. 07-181 (D.D.C., filed July 7, 2007).
176 United States v. Gon, No. 07-181 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2009) (order dismissing
indictment).
177 United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1320-23 (S.D. Fla. 2009). The
attorneys' fees were awarded under the Hyde Amendment, which authorizes an "award to a
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation
expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous,
or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust."
18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West 2010), Historical and Statutory Notes.
178 See Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 1324-25.
179 See United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1132 (D. Mont. 2006).
180 It is not unusual for a court to prohibit recross because recross requires a finding that
the redirecting party introduced evidence outside the scope of direct and cross, but redirect is a
standard part of the examination process. See generally United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276,
280 (3d Cir. 1952) ("Where new evidence is opened up on redirect examination, the opposing
party must be given the right of cross-examination on the new matter, but the privilege of
recross-examination lies within the trial court's discretion."); accord United States v. Perez-
Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003); Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737, 749-50 (5th Cir.
1970). A Westlaw search of ALLFEDS on December 9, 2010 using the search terms (sanction
& (prohibit! Is redirect)) failed to turn up any instances where a court had sanctioned a party
by prohibiting it from redirect.
181 See United States v. Jones, 609 F. Supp. 2d, 113, 115 (D. Mass. 2009) ("Because
Cooley's prior inconsistent statements were ultimately disclosed in time for his false testimony
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the traditional view of Brady, the government has not committed any
wrong if the defendant has not been prejudiced. 182 Thus, Judge Wolf's
serendipitous discovery of inconsistent witness statements would usually
mean that the prosecution might be scolded or reprimanded but no
worse-i.e., no harm, no foul. Judge Wolf was not happy with that out-
come, however, and took the unusual step of ordering a prosecutor in his
district as well as the U.S. Attorney for the Massachusetts district to
show cause why they should not be held in contempt for the prosecutor's
failure to disclose the information.' 83 In the judge's words: "Customary
means of addressing errors and intentional misconduct had proved inade-
quate to prevent the repetition of violations of constitutional duties, the
requirements of the Federal Rules, Local Rules, and court orders con-
cerning discovery."1 84
In one of the more creative attempts to stanch what he perceived as
continuing misconduct, and in lieu of immediate sanctions, Judge Wolf
organized an educational workshop on criminal discovery led by a fed-
eral judge and a federal magistrate. 85 He invited the federal public de-
fender and chair of the Criminal Justice Act Board to participate in
planning the program, ordered the acting U.S. Attorney in Massachusetts
to either participate in planning or name someone in his stead, and or-
dered the acting U.S. Attorney to inform the court as to whether he
would require all criminal prosecutors to attend.186 He also ordered the
offending prosecutor as well as the U.S. Attorney to file briefs after the
workshop explaining why they should not be sanctioned. 87
Judge Wolf ultimately decided not to sanction either the individual
prosecutor or the U.S. Attorney for the failure to disclose exculpatory
information.'88 In his opinion, the judge indicated he was pleased with
the individual prosecutor's efforts not to repeat her previous mistakes,
and with the U.S. Attorney's office generally for its post-Stevens empha-
sis on training prosecutors. 189 He also made the following observation:
"Prosecutors, like judges and all other human beings, are imperfect.
to be discredited, Jones has not been deprived of due process or otherwise prejudiced by the
government's misconduct.").
182 See Janet Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1133, 1151 (2005)
("The Brady standard at trial means that the prosecutor can withhold favorable evidence on the
theory it would not have affected the outcome of the trial . . .
183 Jones, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
184 United States v. Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d 147, 148 (D. Mass. 2010) (order supplement-
ing decision).
185 See United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp. 2d 163, 185 (D. Mass. 2009) (order deferring
decision).
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See Jones, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
189 See id. ("The United States Attorney's Office has made intensive efforts to better
prepare its prosecutors to perform their duties to provide discovery.").
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Therefore, it is only a true rededication to the ideal described by the
Supreme Court, and etched into the entryway to the Attorney General's
office, that will protect the rights promised to all people by our
constitution." 90
This, then, is the connection between the ethical ideals of Brady and
Berger and the need for a rule governing pretrial disclosures: In the ab-
sence of rules that reflect our collective commitment to the ideals of jus-
tice, a criminal trial is more likely to resemble a blood sport than a quest
for justice.19' This is not the result of any personal failings on the part of
prosecutors, 192 but rather the result of the dichotomous duties that federal
prosecutors are asked to fulfill.19 3
III. UNITED STATES V. W.R. GRACE: FROM INDICTMENT
To ACQUI--TAL
In February 2005, W.R. Grace and seven of its executives were in-
dicted for criminally violating the Clean Air Act,19 4 conspiring to violate
the Clean Air Act, obstructing justice, and conspiring to obstruct jus-
tice. 19 5 The case was massive by several standards: the Missoula federal
courtroom added an entire bank of tables for the numerous lawyers rep-
resenting various defendants, hundreds of pretrial motions were briefed,
argued, and decided, the trial spread over eleven weeks, and the number
of documents turned over by the government numbered several mil-
lion l96-even though the government's failure to disclose sufficient doc-
uments ultimately contributed to the demise of its case.
190 See id. at 158 (referring to the inscription on the Department of Justice building, "The
United States wins its point whenever justice is done in its courts").
191 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth? a Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 16 (1990).
192 See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision,
49 How. L.J. 475, 485 (2006) ("For the conscientious prosecutor, as with any conscientious
actor, there will be conflicting loyalties."); Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclo-
sure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 488 (2009) ("[E]ven virtuous prosecutors trying to do justice can err in
their good-faith attempts to apply the doctrine on its own terms[.]").
193 See Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 677, 696 (1984) (Marshall, J. dissenting) ("The
prosecutor is by trade, if not necessity, a zealous advocate. He is a trained attorney who must
aggressively seek convictions in court on behalf of a victimized public. At the same time, as a
representative of the state, he must place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determina-
tion of truth.. .. Given this obviously unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these advo-
cates oftentimes overlook or downplay potentially favorable evidence.").
194 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (2000) ("Any person who knowingly releases into the am-
bient air any hazardous air pollutant listed . . . and who knows at the time that he thereby
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury shall, upon convic-
tion, be punished by a fine under Title 18, or by imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or
both.").
195 See Superseding Indictment, supra note 35.
196 The government initially produced about three million pages of discovery. Gov't's
Consol. Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct at 10,
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The asbestos in Libby occurs naturally in the vermiculite ore that
W.R. Grace and its predecessors mined from the surrounding moun-
tains. 197 The vermiculite was used all over Libby-under roads, under
playgrounds and running tracks, and inside attics. 198 It was the perva-
sive, ongoing presence in Libby of the asbestos-releasing vermiculite that
led to serious health and environmental problems there.199
In an early and significant victory for the defendants, the court ruled
that Congress did not intend for "knowing endangerment" under the
Clean Air Act to be a continuing offense.200 This meant that the govern-
ment could rely only on acts taken by the defendants since November 3,
1999201 to prove that Grace knowingly endangered others by releasing
asbestos. Judge Molloy also ruled before trial that "ambient air" means
"outside air," which meant that the government could not rely on releases
into houses or other buildings to prove its case.202
Thus, as trial began, the government's Clean Air Act case 203 was
limited to acts that occurred after November 1999 and involved outdoor
releases. These rulings made it crucial that the government succeed in
proving conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act. Conspiracy is one of
the few crimes that is inherently a continuing offense, which was the
portal the government needed in order to put into evidence actions Grace
took three or four decades ago. 2 0 4
The government's case was largely built on internal corporate docu-
ments. It was therefore important for the government to make its case
and tell a compelling story to the jury through its witnesses. Robert
Locke was one of those critical witnesses for the prosecution. The gov-
ernment billed him as the key corporate insider who would explain the
United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont, filed Apr. 25, 2009) available at
http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtdlimages/ll24.pdf [hereinafter Gov't's Consol. Opposition to
Defendants' Motions].
197 Superseding Indictment, supra note 35, at paras. 1-6.
198 Id. paras. 25-26, 119-120, 175.
199 See id. (describing asbestos-contaminated vermiculite in Libby, and observing rates of
asbestosis 40-80 times higher than expected in Libby residents).
200 United States v. W.R. Grace, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1245 (D. Mont. 2006).
201 Id. at 1239 n.31 ("Because the Clean Air Act's knowing endangerment provision does
not contain its own statute of limitations, the offense carries the five-year statute of limitations
generally applicable to non-capital federal criminal offenses." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a))).
202 United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (D. Mont. 2006) (interpret-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 7413's criminalization of releases "into the ambient air").
203 Counts II, III, & IV charged violations of the Clean Air Act; Count I charged conspir-
acy; Counts V, VI, VII, and Vm charged obstruction of justice. See Superseding Indictment,
supra note 355, at paras. 185-202.
204 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 122 (1970). Even though conspiracy is a
continuing offense, the government must prove an overt act taken in furtherance of the con-
spiracy within the statutory period. Id.
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inner workings of the W.R. Grace Corporation. 205 His job was to not
only make the memos come alive but also to testify about the early years
of the alleged conspiracy in the 1970s. In the words of principal W.R.
Grace attorney David Bernick, Locke was "the voice of the
documents." 206
A. Pretrial Wrangling
The court's ultimate resolution of the government's failure to dis-
close information regarding Robert Locke had its roots in the many dis-
covery motions filed during the four years before trial.207 The court
wryly observed at one point, "Defendants have established a pattern of
repeatedly 'racing to the court' whether the government has committed a
discovery violation or not." 208 The defense strategy worked, though; by
the time the trial began, the court had made a series of rulings that placed
substantial pressure on the prosecution to disclose a wide range of infor-
mation to the defense. 209 For example, the court ruled that Rule
16(a)(1)(E)'s requirement that the government disclose items in its "pos-
session, custody, or control" was to be measured by the "knowledge and
access test,"210 and the court rejected the "prosecution team" approach
advocated by the government. 211 This affected the government's disclo-
sure obligations under both Rule 16(a)(1)(E) 212 and Brady.213 The court
205 As described by one Grace case blogger, "Imagine a tripod. Without one leg, the
entire structure cannot stand. Locke's testimony is one of those legs; without that leg, the
prosecution's case on all of the counts against WR Grace falls." Christopher Orman, The
Questioning of the Adversarial Process, UM GRACE Case Blog (Apr. 27, 2009, 3:27 PM),
http://www.umt.edulgracecase/day-by-day-aprillapril-27-2009/index.html. However, Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney Kevin Cassidy represented to the court at the evidentiary hearing on the
motions to strike Locke's testimony or dismiss the indictment that the government's case did
not rely solely on Locke's testimony. Shannon Foley, Prosecution Defends Itself Against
Flurry of Accusations, Interruptions, UM GRACE Case Blog (Apr. 27, 2009), http://
www.umt.edu/gracecase/day-by-day-april/april-27-2009/index.html [hereinafter Foley, Prose-
cution Defends Itselfl.
206 Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Due to the Gov't's Repeated and
Intentional Misconduct at 34, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont.
Apr. 23, 2009) (quoting Transcript of Record at 24-25, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-
07-M-DWM (D. Mont. Apr. 17, 2009)), available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtd/
images/i 113.pdf [hereinafter Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct].
207 See, e.g., id. at 2 (describing one such motion to compel the production of materials).
208 United States v. W.R. Grace, 235 F.R.D. 692, 696 n. 5 (D. Mont. 2006).
209 See, e.g., id. at 696.
210 U.S v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074-75 (D. Mont. 2005) ("Information
held by federal agencies not directly involved with the investigation is nonetheless discovera-
ble under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) if the prosecutor has knowledge of and access to the information.").
211 Id. at 1078 ("In my view, the law of the Ninth Circuit prohibits adoption of the flawed
'prosecution team' idea.").
212 Id. at 1075.
213 Id. at 1079 ("Appreciation of the knowledge and access test in this case shows that the
United States takes an impermissibly narrow view of its obligations under Brady. It is insuffi-
cient for Brady purposes for the prosecution to produce only that information from other agen-
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acknowledged that, under its interpretation, the "constitutional obliga-
tions may prove burdensome to the prosecution." 2 14 However, it evinced
no sympathy: "[T]he government has levied a broad and complex Indict-
ment. . . . The Constitution does not go too far in defense of due process
when it requires that the prosecution's search for evidence favorable to
the accused be as far-reaching as the search for evidence against him."215
As part of this same series of discovery orders, the court held that
Rule 16(a)(1)(E) required the government to disclose information under-
lying its asbestos sampling results. 2 1 6 The court also decided that Rule
16(a)(1)(B)(ii) required the disclosure of an agent's "rough notes" taken
during interviews of any past or present employees of Grace if the gov-
ernment intended to use an employee's statement or conduct at trial to
bind Grace.217 Finally, the court ruled that documents related to EPA's
investigation of air quality after the collapse of the World Trade Center
towers were discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) because they might re-
veal inconsistent statements made by EPA about the dangers of airborne
asbestos. 218
Regarding the prosecution's Brady obligations, the court stated,
"Brady places an affirmative duty on the prosecutor to seek out informa-
tion in the government's possession that is favorable to the defen-
dant."219 Although it stated that information must be material before its
suppression violates Brady,220 it did not incorporate that significant limi-
tation into its ultimate pronouncement of the government's duty: "The
prosecution must inform itself as to all information in the government's
possession, and disclose that which is favorable to the accused."221
Having established the scope of discovery, the court moved on to
more substantive motions. In mid-2006, the court dismissed Count I of
the original indictment, which alleged conspiracy to violate the Clean Air
cies that has found its way into the physical possession of the prosecutor.") The court
mentioned several federal agencies whose documents would be deemed within the prosecu-
tion's possession, custody or control. Id. at 1077 (listing the EPA, NIOSH, MSHA, CPSC,
BLM, USGS, and ATSDR).
214 Id. at 1080.
215 Id.
216 United States v. W.R. Grace, 233 F.R.D. 586, 590 (D. Mont. 2005).
217 United States v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (D. Mont. 2005).
218 United States v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1086 (D. Mont. 2006) (holding
that the documents were "within the prosecution's possession, custody and control for pur-
poses of Rule 16" and that they were material under Rule 16 because "the defense may be
aided by documents tending to show that the agency ... made determinations elsewhere that
conflict with critical allegations here").
219 Id. at 1075.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1076 (emphasis added). The requirement to disclose all information favorable to
the defense is broader than a requirement to disclose all material exculpatory and impeaching
information. See infra Part I.
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Act's "knowing endangerment" provision, on statute-of-limitations
grounds. 2 2 2 The dismissal was grounded in the indictment's failure to
allege any overt acts taken in furtherance of the knowing endangerment
object within the limitations period. 22 3
Two weeks after Count I was dismissed, the government filed a
superseding indictment with minor changes to properly plead the Count I
conspiracy.22 4 The defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing that the
defect had not been cured by the new indictment, and that even if it had
been, the previous indictment was dismissed with prejudice. 2 2 5 Although
the court denied that the superseding indictment was prohibited by the
dismissal of the original indictment with prejudice, 226 it held that the
substantive defects in the original indictment had not been cured and
could not be saved by a six-month statutory grace period, and again dis-
missed the conspiracy charge on statute of limitations grounds.2 2 7
Toward the end of this opinion, the court's tone toward the govern-
ment notably changed: "Government counsel characterized the prosecu-
tion's case as a quest for justice. Justice is the primary concern of this
Court as well." 2 2 8 Reflecting the court's emerging view that the govern-
ment was overreaching and that the court-not the government-was the
primary protector of justice, the court said:
While the prosecution views its quest for justice as the
pursuit of a particular outcome, this Court is bound to
uphold that conception of justice, rooted in our Constitu-
tion and laws, that lies in the process. The knowing en-
dangerment object of the Count I conspiracy is time-
barred. Section 3288 cannot save it. Some may say this
determination is based on a mere technicality but that
would miss the point. "In a society devoted to the rule
of law, the difference between violating or not violating
222 United States v. W.R. Grace, 434 F. Supp. 2d 879, 888 (D. Mont. 2006). This ruling
reflects the ruling discussed earlier, in which the court held that knowing endangerment is not
a continuing offense. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Grace closed the Libby
mine in 1990, Superseding Indictment, supra note 35, at para. 27, which meant the statute of
limitations presented obvious problems.
223 Id.
224 Superseding Indictment, supra note 35.
225 Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Clean Air Act Object of Count I of the Su-
perseding Indictment, to Suspend the Arraignment Pending Decision on the Motion, and to
Expedite Briefing at 2-4, United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d, 1113 (D. Mont. 2006)
(CR-05-07-M-DWM), available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtdlimages/596.pdf.
226 United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1119 (D. Mont. 2006).
227 Id. at 1121-22.
228 Id.
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a criminal statute cannot be shrugged aside as a minor
detail." 229
The course of the litigation changed significantly after this order
was entered. The government filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth
Circuit,23 0 which reversed the dismissal of Count I on statute of limita-
tions grounds.231 In addition, the government's earlier appeal of an order
requiring it to produce a final witness list one year before trial, as well as
some key evidentiary rulings, was initially reversed by a three-judge
panel232 but eventually affirmed by an en banc panel. 2 3 3 After the de-
fendants unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari, 234 the case returned to
district court after a two-year hiatus with the district court's power to
manage the trial affirmed, but its interpretation of the governing law
reversed.235
At a status conference shortly after the case returned to district
court, the court asked the government whether it had continued to pro-
duce documents to the defendants during the pendency of the appeal.236
The government replied it had not and tried to explain how difficult its
duty was:
[T]hese efforts that we take to comply with Rule 16 and
the Court's discovery orders are monstrous. And we
can't do them on a monthly basis. It's just-it is not
possible. So what we tried to do was wait until we had
certainty from the Supreme Court and then we sent out
229 Id. at 1121-22 (quoting Goldyn v. Hayes, 444 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006)).
230 Opening Brief of the United States and Petition for Writ of Mandamus, United States
v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007) (06-30472, 06-30524).
231 United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 751-54 (9th Cir. 2007).
232 United States v. W.R. Grace, 493 F.3d 1119, 1123; 1127-32 (9th Cir. 2007).
233 United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 503, 508-16 (9th Cir. 2008).
234 W.R. Grace v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008) (mem.) (denying certiorari);
Eschenbach v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
235 See W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
236 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 20-21
(quoting Status Conference Transcript for Oct. 24, 2008 at 23-24). In its brief opposing a
motion to compel, the government described the process of fulfilling its discovery obligations
as follows:
It requires hundreds of federal employees in nine federal agencies to review files for
relevant documents. These materials must then be reviewed by agency attorneys for
privileged materials. The privileged materials must be set aside and privilege logs
created. All materials must be scanned, bates stamped, and placed into a searchable
database for the defendants. The Department of Justice must then perform quality
control review of each agency's privilege logs. This massive undertaking simply
cannot physically or logistically be performed on an intermittent or rolling basis as
suggested by the defendants.
United States' Response to the Defendants' Joint Motion to Compel Production of Discovery
and Joint Motion for Sanctions at para. 3, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM
(D. Mont. filed Dec. 19, 2008) available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtd/images/868.pdf.
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this monstrous request to all the federal agencies that we
surveyed for our first disclosure back in January '06.237
If the government thought this description of an overwhelming wor-
kload would elicit a sympathetic response from the court, it was mis-
taken. In a scheduling order issued immediately after the status
conference, the court set the eventual trial date of February 19, 2009238
and ordered the government to produce all remaining documents subject
to discovery under Brady and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure on October 27, 2008-a mere three days after the order was
entered.2 3 9
Amazingly, the government complied and produced 1.7 million
pages of documents within three days and several hundred thousand
more pages over the next month.240 Nonetheless, the defendants found
multiple problems with the production including several failures to pro-
duce exculpatory material and one instance in which the government had
deleted relevant emails.2 4 1 The defendants filed several motions to com-
pel that led the court to issue an order warning the government that it
should be prepared to "immediately supply any material to which the
Court find the Defendants are entitled" 242 and stating that failure to com-
ply would result in sanctions.2 4 3 Although the government appealed the
court's order that the government produce its witness list a year before
trial, 244 it did not appeal the court's arguably broad interpretation of the
government's Brady obligation.
In January of 2009, a month before trial started, the court issued an
order addressing several pending motions to compel discovery. 24 5 After
ordering and denying some discovery, the court addressed the defend-
ants' request for sanctions on the grounds that they had been prejudiced
by the government's failure to produce any discovery during the two-
year appeal process. The court was derisive of the government's failure,
237 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 21 (quot-
ing Status Conference Transcript for Oct. 24, 2008, at 23-24).
238 Order at 1, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. Oct. 24,
2008), available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtdlimages/818.pdf [hereinafter 2008 Grace
Order I].
239 Id. at 3.
240 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 20-21.
241 Id. at 22.
242 Order at 1, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. Dec. 12,
2008, available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtd/images/863.pdf [hereinafter 2008 Grace
Order II].
243 Id. at 2.
244 United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the court's
authority to enter such an order).
245 Order, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. Jan. 14, 2009),
available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtd/images/881.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Grace Order
II].
2010] 347
348 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:313
saying that the government simply had not found disclosure "conve-
nient."246 Nonetheless, the court noted that the touchstone of a sanctions
inquiry is whether the party has suffered prejudice, and it observed that
the defendants had offered "little evidence of prejudice resulting from the
delay." 2 4 7 The court also noted that the defendants did not ask for any
documents during that time by referring to the defendant's "lack of curi-
osity regarding any evidentiary development."248 Because the defend-
ants still had a month to prepare for trial, the court found no prejudice
and denied the motion.249
Thus, as trial began in February 2009, the parties had been fighting
for years over the government's discovery obligations. The court had
interpreted the government's discovery obligations broadly, and the gov-
ernment was struggling to keep up.
B. The Government's Acts & Omissions
The damaging testimony of Robert Locke took place on direct ex-
amination, during the fourth week of trial.250 When asked for the dates
of any meetings he had with prosecutors or investigating agents, Locke
said he had met six times with the government. 25 1 In response to a ques-
tion about his relationship with the government, Locke testified that he
had learned in 2005 that he was "on a list of criminal conspirators" and
was concerned he might be indicted. 252 After meeting with the govern-
ment, Locke was offered a letter of immunity, which he declined to
take.2 5 3 The prosecution had not turned the immunity letter over to the
defendants. 254 The defendants immediately moved for an order compel-
ling the government to turn over the letter, which was granted. 255 Two
days later-less than an hour before Locke's cross-examination was to
begin-the prosecution turned over the letter. 256
Locke also testified on direct that defendant Robert Bettachi had
callously said "caveat emptor" in response to Locke's expression of con-
246 Id. at 4-5.
247 Id. at 17.
248 Id. at 17.
249 Id. at 19.
250 See Carly Flandro, Former Grace Employee Takes the Stand, UM Grace Case Blog
(Mar. 23, 2009, 10:25 AM), http://www.umt.edu/gracecase/day-by-day-march-2/march-23-
2009/index.html; Kathryn Mazurek, Locke Called as a Witness, UM Grace Case Blog (Mar.
23, 2009, 10:55 AM), http://www.umt.edu/gracecase/day-by-day-march-2/march-23-2009/
index.html.
251 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 35 (quot-
ing Trial Transcript for Mar. 23, 2009 at 3596).
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 37 (quoting Trial Transcript for Mar. 23, 2009, at 3695).
255 Id. at 37 (quoting Trial Transcript for March 23, 2009, at 3695).
256 Id. at 37 n.1 (quoting Trial Transcript for March 23, 2009, at 4032).
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cern over Grace's sale of contaminated property to Libby residents Mel
and Lerah Parker. 2 5 7 The defendants moved to strike this testimony, 258
which was eventually determined by the judge to be false 2 5 9 but not per-
jurious. 2 6 0 During Locke's cross-examination, the defense brought out
Locke's bitter history with Grace, including his disappointment when de-
fendant Robert Bettachi was promoted over him in the 1970s and 1980s,
and his pending civil lawsuit against Grace for employment discrimina-
tion. 2 6 1 Arguably, the defendants did an excellent job of impeaching his
credibility.
Then the government's problems took a turn for the worse. During
Locke's cross-examination, Bert Marsden, the primary EPA case agent
working with Locke, realized he had "a couple hundred" emails from
Locke that had not been disclosed to the defense.2 6 2 Agent Marsden
went home, printed many of the emails, deleted several, gave the ones he
had printed to the prosecution, and waited.263 On April 7, almost two
weeks after Locke's cross-examination, the government began producing
the Locke-Marsden emails to the defendants. 264 The government admit-
ted that the emails were impeachment material subject to disclosure
under Giglio v. United States265 and the Jencks Act. 2 6 6
The defendants then moved to compel a range of documents related
to Locke and complained that the emails "demonstrate[d] more clearly
than ever Mr. Locke's intense prosecutorial partnership with the Govern-
ment and his obsession with seeking revenge against Defendant Grace,
257 Id. at 37-38 (quoting Trial Transcript for March 23, 2009, at 4046-47).
258 See Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike the Testimony of Robert Locke, United States
v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. filed Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://
www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtd/images/1021.pdf.
259 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49 at 5 ("[T]he record does not permit us to know for
certain whether Locke presented a convenient remembrance, a crafty embellishment, or an
outright lie.").
260 Id. at 11 ("[W]hile there is ample evidence of his untrustworthiness, and a strong
circumstantial case for perjury, there is no irrefutable objective proof that he perjured
himself.").
261 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 38.
262 See Gov't's Consol. Opposition to Defendants' Motions, supra note 196, at 13; De-
fendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 41 (quoting Trial
Transcript for Apr. 15, 2009, at 150).
263 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 41 (quot-
ing Trial Transcript for Apr. 15, 2009, at 150). The deleted emails were eventually recovered
from an EPA server and turned over to the defense. Daniel Doherty, Marsden Testifies on
Locke Bias, Immunity, UM Grace Case Blog (April 17, 2009 5:02 p.m.), http://www.umt.edu/
gracecase/2009/04/17/marsden-testifies-on-locke-bias-immunityindex.html.
264 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 42.
265 See 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
266 See Gov't's Consol. Opposition to Defendants' Motions, supra note 196, at 15
("[C]ertain of the Locke to Marsden e-mails should have been disclosed previously as im-
peachment materials under Giglio, as Rule 16 statements that could be used to bind the Defen-
dant corporation, or as Jencks material.").
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Defendant Bettacchi, and the other Defendants." 267 On April 10, 2009,
the court ordered the government to turn over all correspondence be-
tween Locke and any government agent or government witness, the hard
drive to his personal computer, any evidence of remuneration or compen-
sation that the government may have paid to Locke, Locke's calendars,
and all notes or videos of meetings Locke had with the government.268
The court also ordered a deposition of Locke in front of U.S. Magistrate
Jeremiah Lynch and set a hearing on the defendants' motion to strike
Locke's testimony for April 17, 2009.269
At the end of that hearing, the defendants argued that the only rem-
edy for the range of problems with the government's case was to dismiss
the indictment. 270 The government acknowledged its errors but argued
that additional cross-examination of Locke would cure any problems. 271
Those observing the hearing thought that the judge was angry enough
with the government and that the government's case was sufficiently in-
coherent to make the odds of dismissal better than even: 2 7 2
The day ended with [Judge] Molloy stating he was con-
cerned with what he deemed was the "underlying prob-
lem here, which is about the process being tainted." He
then proceeded to call Robert Locke a "liar."273
[Judge] Molloy concluded his comments by stating the
following, "The way of business here appears problem-
atic to me. . . . I am reminded of an instance where as a
young attorney I saw federal agents absolutely destroy a
home during a search. It was not right. Somebody in
the Department of Justice needs to have the courage to
do what is right." 274
267 Defendants' Joint Motion to Compel Discovery Regarding Robert Locke at 1, United
States v. W.R. Grace, No. CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://
www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtdlimages/1030.pdf.
268 See Order at 3-5, United States v. W.R. Grace, CR-05-07-M-DWM (D. Mont. Apr.
10, 2009), available at http://www.mtb.uscourts.gov/mtd/images/1049.pdf [hereinafter 2009
Grace Order IH].
269 See id. at 6.
270 See Will Grant, Defense Argues for Dismissal of Case, UM Grace Case Blog (Apr. 17,
2009, 5:15 PM), http://umt.edulgracecase/2009/04/17/defense-argues-for-dismissal-of-case/.
271 See id.
272 Christopher Orman, Defense Makes Its Case on Prosecutorial Misconduct-"This
Case Should Be Dismissed," UM Grace Case Blog (April 17, 2009, 6:38 PM), http://
www.umt.edu/gracecase/day-by-day-aprillapril-17-2009/index.html ("Arguably, the defense
did not meet the necessary burden of proof. However, by all appearances, Judge Molloy be-
lieved they did.").
273 See generally Kirk Johnson, Prosecution in Asbestos Poisoning of Montana Town Is
Forced to Go on Defense, N.Y. THias, April 25, 2009, at A9 (Judge Molloy making statement
outside of the presence of the jury).
274 Orman, supra note 272.
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The judge ended the hearing by saying, "I think we have a very,
very serious problem." 275
A few days later, even more undisclosed agent notes between the
government and Locke were produced. 2 7 6 The government's credibility
was unraveling quickly, the defendants were preparing to pounce, and
the court's irritation was focused squarely on the government. Ten days
later, at a hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment for
prosecutorial misconduct, Judge Molloy was "clearly angry."27 7 The
prosecutors apologized for their errors and omissions 278 but insisted they
did not believe Locke had lied.2 7 9
C. The Court's Resolution
Although those in attendance at the hearing predicted the court
would impose the drastic remedy of dismissal,280 the court did not. The
court addressed two factors that must be established to dismiss for
prosecutorial misconduct-first, that the witness could not be recalled,
and second, that the government had acted flagrantly, willfully, and in
bad faith. 28 1 The court found neither prong satisfied. 282 The court began
by noting, "The government has committed clear and admitted violations
of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 16, [the Jencks Act], Brady[,]
and Giglio."283
275 Grant, supra note 270.
276 See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Misconduct, supra note 206, at 57.
277 Kirk Johnson, Judge in Asbestos Case Angrily Lectures Prosecutors, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr.
28, 2009, at A17; see Josh Benham, Molloy: Trust in Prosecution Almost Gone, UM GRACE
CASE BLOG (Apr. 27, 2009, 4:50 PM), http://umt.edu/gracecase/day-by-day-aprillapril-27-
2009 (stating that Judge no longer trusts the government's lawyers prosecuting the case); see
also Foley, Prosecution Defends Itself, supra note 205 ("The response from the bench was that
hell will probably freeze over before he and the prosecution can agree on that fact.").
278 See 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 2 ("The government suggested at oral
argument that it referred to its 'mistake, violation, error, misstep or regret' . . . in its brief in
response to the motions to dismiss.").
279 See Foley, Prosecution Defends Itself, supra note 205 (Prosecutor responding that he
does not believe that Locke perjured his testimony).
280 See generally Orman, supra note 272 (Judge Molloy appearing to agree with the de-
fense on showings of prosecutorial misconduct).
281 See 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 9 n. 1.
282 See id.; cf Pub. L. No. 105-119, tit. VI, § 617, 111 Stat. 2519 (1997) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006)) (automatically precluding an award of attorneys' fees
under the Hyde Amendment, which requires a finding that the government's actions were
"vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith").
283 2009 Grace Order 1, supra note 49, at 6 ("While the prosecution initially resisted any
such characterization of its non-disclosure as a violation of any obligation, counsel for the
government now concede their error and profess to take full responsibility for it."). But see
FED. R. CRuw. P. 16 (requiring disclosure of Locke's statements that the government intended
to rely on to bind Grace); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2010) (not requiring disclosure until after the
witness testifies).
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The court seemed especially perturbed by the government's conten-
tion that the job of disclosing so much information to the defendants was
more than it could reasonably bear:. "The government's own attorneys
argue that the demands of this sprawling case are so daunting that the
Court must permit the occasional nonmalicious violation of the Defend-
ants' constitutional rights." 284 The court refused to view the govern-
ment's discovery obligations separately from its charging decisions,
however, and insisted that any burden of the former flowed directly from
the breadth of the latter:
The size of the case, and the resulting disclosure obliga-
tion, is a condition of the government's choosing. The
constitution and the law do not yield when the govern-
ment casts a wide net in the charging decision. . . . The
history of this case suggests that the failure to disclose
documents related to Locke is merely the latest manifes-
tation of a systemic problem, i.e., that the Department of
Justice charged a case larger than the one it prepared to
prosecute. 285
Ultimately, the court found that although the government had acted
terribly and the prosecutors must shoulder the blame, the mistakes did
not add up to prosecutorial misconduct.286 Nonetheless, the court said,
"What is clear from the record is that the government's conduct creates a
climate in which the Defendants' constitutional rights are at risk, and the
court's role of ensuring the fair administration of justice is
complicated." 2 87
The court then searched for a remedy for the two distinct wrongs it
found: first, Locke's "incredible" testimony, 28 8 and second, the govern-
ment's failure to fulfill its Brady/Giglio obligations. 289 While acknowl-
edging that the issues were distinct in terms of the underlying wrongs,
the court noted that the issues were otherwise so "intertwined" that they
would be "addressed collectively in the implementation of the rem-
edy." 290 The court considered a range of possible remedies from dis-
284 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 8.
285 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
286 See id. at 9.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 4.
289 See id. at 6; see also Gov't's Consol. Opposition to Defendants' Motions, supra note
196, at 15 ("Certain of the Locke to Marsden e-mails should have been disclosed previously as
impeachment material under Giglio, as Rule 16 statements that could be used to bind the
Defendant corporation, or as Jencks material. Those e-mails, along with the agent notes that
should have been disclosed pursuant to this Court's Rule 16 discovery orders, should be the
focus of this Court's inquiry into discovery violations.").
290 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 4.
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missing the indictment to declaring a mistral to striking Locke's
testimony in its entirety.291 Dismissal was not warranted because the
prosecutors' disclosure violations did not rise to the level of prosecutorial
misconduct, and a mistrial was not favored by either party. 292 Striking
Locke's testimony in its entirety had "some appeal in light of the
prejudice occasioned by the government's non-disclosure and the unreli-
able nature of Locke's testimony," but it was deemed to be going "too
far."293
The court concluded that the "minimally intrusive solution . . . [was]
to allow Locke's testimony to stand, subject to the following conditions
intended to cure the prejudice to the Defendants resulting from the gov-
ernment's failure to disclose." 294 First, the court would allow additional
cross-examination of Locke regarding "his relationship and meetings
with the government, his animus toward the Defendants, and his status in
relation to immunity." 295 Because Locke's testimony was deemed "es-
pecially prejudicial" to defendant Robert Bettachi, 296 the court stated that
"the continued cross-examination of Locke [would] be accompanied by
an instruction to the jury that it [could] not rely upon the testimony of
Robert Locke in deciding Defendant Bettachi's guilt or innocence on any
charge." 297 The court also announced that it would instruct the jury that
Locke was back on the stand because the government had "failed to fully
disclose information to the defense as required by the rules and the Con-
stitution" and that "the jury should view Locke's entire testimony with
skepticism." 298 Finally, the court prohibited the government from con-
ducting redirect examination of Locke.299
The instruction turned out to be a lengthy soliloquy that essentially
told the jury that the government had cheated and its star witness was a
liar.300 For example, the court told the jury: "In this case, the Depart-
ment of Justice and the United States Attorney's Office have violated
their constitutional obligations to the defendants, they have violated the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and they have violated orders of
291 Id. at 10.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 11. The court did not specify the prejudice that had occurred, other than Robert
Bettachi, who was "uniquely prejudiced" due to Locke's "caveat emptor" testimony regarding
Bettachi. Id. at 11-12. See generally Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Due to Gov't Miscon-
duct, supra note 206, at 38-39.
295 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 11.
296 Id. at 12.
297 Id. at 13.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 See infra Appendix: Locke Jury Instruction.
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the Court."o30 After explaining that the government has an "affirmative
responsibility to learn of any evidence favorable to the accused and to
disclose such evidence in a timely manner so that it can be effectively
used by the accused," the court said, "As a sanction for this inexcusable
dereliction of duty the Court has entered an order that prohibits consider-
ation of any proof offered by Robert Locke in the case brought against
Robert Bettacchi."302 The court went on to say:
Having made this ruling the court does not mean to sug-
gest that you should give any more credence to Robert
Locke's testimony as to any of the other defendants. In-
deed, you should examine Locke's entire testimony with
great skepticism and with greater caution than that of
other witnesses....
You will have to decide what weight to give to Locke's testimony if
any but you should be very cautious about making a determination of
criminal liability for any defendant based upon his proof.3 0 3
With this, the government was left with no appealable rulings, no
witness to make the documents come alive, and no credibility with the
jurors. Ten days later, the jury acquitted all remaining defendants of all
charges.3 04
IV. THE GRACE COURT ArrEMPTS To Do JUSTICE: ANALYZING
THE REMEDY
"It is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for
the conduct of a fair and lawful trial."3 05
The Supreme Court offers little guidance for lower courts as they
attempt to enforce the lofty principles articulated in Brady, which has led
many trial courts-including the Grace court-to cobble together a mix
of remedies and sanctions. The size and complexity of the Grace trial
made it a challenge for the government to adhere to prescribed proce-
dures-a challenge, the Grace court noted more than once, that was
brought on by the government's own charging decisions. 306 But the ab-
sence of bright-line rules regarding the government's pretrial and trial
disclosure obligations arguably affects charging decisions as much as
remedies.
301 Id. para. 3.
302 Id.
303 Id. paras. 5-6.
304 See Proposed Order, United States v. Theodore Stevens, No. 08-231 (EGS) (D.D.C.
Apr. 1, 2009); Press Release, Statement of Williams & Connolly LLP, Brendan V. Sullivan,
Jr., and Robert M. Cary, Counsel to Senator Ted Stevens (Apr. 1, 2009) (on file with author).
305 Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978).
306 See 2009 Grace Order I, supra note 49, at 6-8.
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The Grace court's remedy was designed to rectify two errors made
by the prosecution: first, Robert Locke's testimony, which the court con-
cluded was "incredible" and bordered on perjury, and second, the gov-
ernment's failure to disclose impeachment information to the defense in
time for the defense to use it on Locke's initial cross-examination. 30 7
The government's failure to disclose impeaching evidence about Locke
was a "real" Brady violation only if the evidence was not cumulative of
other evidence, was favorable to the defendant, and would likely have
affected the verdict, i.e., material.308 In other words, even if the govern-
ment wrongly withheld impeachment information about Locke, the de-
fendants did not necessarily suffer a "real" Brady violation. Most
importantly, because the evidence was disclosed to the defendants in
time for them to use it in cross-examination, an appellate court would
almost certainly have concluded that the defendants were not prejudiced.
Even the government's apparent concession on materiality309 should not
have foreclosed an independent inquiry into materiality. In the absence
of prejudice, the government did not commit a "real" Brady violation; it
made mistakes that the trial court was able to and did correct.
The court's harsh description of the wrongs committed by the gov-
ernment may therefore have overstated the prosecution's errors. The
court's description did more than that, however; it came close to crossing
the boundary between the provinces of the judge and the trier of fact. It
is considered highly persuasive to the jury when a prosecutor vouches for
a witness's credibility. 310 It must surely be even more persuasive when a
judge tells the jury to "examine [a witness's] entire testimony with great
skepticism and with greater caution than that of other witnesses" and to
307 Id. at 4.
308 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
309 See Gov't's Consol. Opposition to Defendants' Motions, supra note 196, at 36 ("[Tlhe
Government understands that the Court must deal with the untimely disclosures in an effort to
ensure that the Defendants receive a fair trial and that the verdict is not unworthy of
confidence.").
310 Prosecutors are prohibited from vouching for a witness's credibility for this reason.
See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-5.8(b) (1993) ("The prosecutor
should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testi-
mony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant."). Prosecutors are prohibited from vouching
for a witness's credibility for this reason. "The prosecutor should not express his or her per-
sonal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the
defendant." CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-5.8(b) (3d ed., 1993),
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfuncblk.html#5.8.
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"be very cautious about making a determination of criminal liability for
any defendant based upon his proof."311
The instruction given by the federal judge in Shaygan, another fed-
eral case involving delayed disclosure of impeaching information during
trial, provides a useful contrast. 312 Like the Grace instruction, it was
designed to explain to the jury that a witness was returning to the stand
for additional cross-examination as a result of untimely disclosures by
the government:
THE COURT: Okay. So, members of the jury, I have an
instruction for you. I am now going to reopen the de-
fense cross-examination of two prior witnesses. These
are witnesses you have heard from, Carlos Vento and
Trinity Clendening. And the reason is that the United
States has failed to provide timely to the defense certain
information and discovery materials which could have
been used by the defense during its cross-examination of
each of these witnesses.
This occurred through no fault of the defense. Now dur-
ing the cross-examination that you are going to hear, I
expect that you will hear reference to the substance of
recorded conversations of defense counsel or members
of the defense team by these two witnesses. I have per-
sonally reviewed the substance of the recorded conversa-
tions, and I can assure you that the defense did nothing
wrong. Because I concluded that the United States has
acted improperly in not turning over the necessary dis-
covery materials and also by allowing recordings to oc-
cur in the first place, I am reopening the witnesses'
examination so you can hear everything that occurred.
Other than that, I [have] no further comment on the evi-
dence. Go ahead and recall the witness, please.3 13
Thus, the judge in Shaygan explained what was going to happen and
why, and then proceeded to assure the jurors that they should not ascribe
any of this to the defense. He did not criticize the government for its
failures other than to say that the government "has failed to timely pro-
vide to the defense certain information and discovery materials," and that
311 Locke Instruction infra note 330, at 3, paras. 5-6; see Bollenbach v. United States,
326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) ("Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge's last word is apt to be the
decisive word.").
312 See United States v. Shaygan, No. 08-20112-CR, 2009 WL 980289 (S.D. Fla. April
14, 2009).
313 Transcript of Record at 67-68, United States v. Shaygan, 2009 WL 980289 (S.D. Fla.
March 10, 2009) (No. 08-20112-CR).
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"the United States has acted improperly in not turning over the necessary
discovery materials." 3 14 Dr. Shaygan's acquittal of 141 charges after
only three hours of deliberation3 15 supports the proposition that even a
restrained statement by the trial judge can have a profound effect on the
jury.316 To the extent the effect of the Grace court's comments could
have been alleviated through redirect of Locke, the prohibition on redi-
rect added to the weight of the remedy and made it that much more
difficult for the prosecution to recover.
"While the practice is not without some danger,"3 17 it has long been
recognized that a trial judge "may express his opinion upon the facts,
provided he makes it clear to the jury that all matters of fact are submit-
ted to their determination."31s The exceptions are when the trial judge
comments on a criminal defendant's testimony3 19 or when the effect of
his instruction is to direct a particular verdict. 320 The court must make
clear to the jury that the essential fact questions-such as Locke's credi-
bility-are for the jury's determination. 321 Importantly, the Grace court
told the jurors that Locke's credibility was ultimately up to them. 3 2 2
Nonetheless, the court overstated the government's errors and
overcorrected the harm. It began with an overly broad statement of the
government's Brady obligations that the government never objected to,
and then relied on prosecutors' ethical obligations to conclude that a seri-
ous wrong had been committed. It crafted a remedy that overstepped the
boundary between its province and that of the jury's, and added a puni-
tive prohibition on redirect. Its remedy is in many ways unprecedented;
because the government failed to file an interlocutory appeal, it is also
unreviewable.
The Grace court's underlying frustration with the government most
certainly contributed to its sweeping remedy. But this frustration is not
limited to one court in one case; it instead seems to be the tip of an
iceberg indicating a deeper systemic problem with criminal discovery.
Moreover, this problem is not new. It has been discussed and studied for
314 Id. at 68.
315 See Shaygan, 2009 WL 980289, at *1.
316 The Supreme Court has noted this power of the judge as "to whose lightest word the
jury properly enough give a great weight." Allison v. United States, 160 U.S. 203, 207 (1985).
317 Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1997).
318 Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); see, e.g., United States v. Phila. &
Reading R.R., 123 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1887).
319 E.g., Quercia, 289 U.S. at 472 (overturning conviction where judge told jury that
people who wipe their hands together as they speak are, in his experience, always lying, fol-
lowed by, "I think that every single word that man said ... was a lie.").
320 See Powell v. Galaza, 328 F.3d 558, 563-66 (9th Cir. 2003).
321 See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 2001).
322 Locke Instruction infra note 330, at 4, paras. 6-7.
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almost a decade; the time is ripe for an amendment to Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
V. CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM
It is not necessary to reinvent the wheel in order to reform criminal
discovery. The federal Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules proposed
specific language to amend Rule 16 in 2006, by adding subsection (H) to
Rule 16(a)(1):
(H) Exculpatory or Impeaching Information. Upon a de-
fendant's request, the government must make available
all information that is known to the attorney for the gov-
ernment or agents of law enforcement involved in the
investigation of the case that is either exculpatory or im-
peaching. The court may not order disclosure of im-
peachment information earlier than 14 days before
trial.323
The proposed committee note began with a statement of commit-
ment to fairness, and a citation to the ABA standards for prosecutors and
defense attorneys as well as several Brady cases. 324 It then explained:
The rule contains no requirement that the information be
"material" to guilt in the sense that this term is used in
cases such as Kyles v. Whitley.325 It requires prosecutors
to disclose to the defense all exculpatory or impeaching
information known to any law enforcement agency that
323 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Brady Material, supra note 119, at 23.
324 Id. at 23-24 (New subdivision (a)(1)(H) is based on the principle that fundamental
fairness is enhanced when the defense has access before trial to any exculpatory or impeaching
information known to the prosecution. The requirement that exculpatory and impeaching in-
formation be provided to the defense also reduces the possibility that innocent persons will be
convicted in federal proceedings). See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM.
BAR Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3-3.11(a) (3d ed., 1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/
pfunc-blk.html#3. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2003). The amendment
is intended to supplement the prosecutor's obligations to disclose material exculpatory or im-
peaching information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972), Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,
280-81 (1999), and Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004).
325 It is not clear why the Committee chose to cite Kyles for materiality rather than Bag-
ley. Bagley established the "confidence in the outcome" standard that defines materiality to
this day. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Kyles was decided ten years
later, and established some interpretive rules that are more favorable to defendants (e.g., that
the defendant does not have to show by a preponderance that he would have been acquitted in
order to establish materiality, that it is not a sufficiency of the evidence test, that once a "real"
Brady violation is established, there is no need for harmless-error review, and that materiality
is to be assessed in light of the cumulative evidence that was suppressed). See Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-48 (1995).
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participated in the prosecution or investigation of the
case without further speculation as to whether this infor-
mation will ultimately be material to guilt.3 2 6
The note explained that the proposed rule distinguishes exculpatory
and impeachment information only for purposes of when disclosures
have to be made and defines exculpatory information as any information
that "tends to cast doubt upon the defendant's guilt as to any essential
element in any count in the indictment or information." 327 Finally, the
proposed rule allows the government to apply for a protective order
under Rule 16(d)(1) to delay disclosures if needed.328
This proposed amendment addresses problems identified by the
government and by commentators regarding the definition of exculpa-
tory, the timing of the disclosures, and the protection of witnesses. The
amended version of Rule would be enforceable as a pretrial obligation,
and would allow the government to move for protective orders in those
cases where disclosure of witness names may be dangerous.
CONCLUSION
The increasing frustration of trial court judges with criminal discov-
ery is the strongest evidence yet that criminal discovery must be re-
formed. When judges begin to complain, and more importantly, begin
looking for alternative ways to achieve justice, it is time for rule makers
to take notice. Criminal discovery has long been viewed as a problem
between prosecutors and defendants, prosecutors and their own con-
sciences, or defendants and the criminal justice system. The Grace trial
demonstrates that criminal discovery has become a problem for district
court judges who are endowed with the authority to manage their own
dockets and the power to control trials in their courtroom, but who are
also asked to ensure that justice is done.
Amending Rule 16 would provide uniformity throughout the federal
system. 329 It would create clear obligations that would not require prose-
cutors to step into the shoes of defense counsel to determine materiality.
It would ensure fair trials for defendants. Most importantly, it would
326 FED. JUDICIAL Cm., Brady Material, supra note 119, at 23.
327 Id. at 24
328 See id. ("The government may apply to the court for a protective order concerning
exculpatory or impeaching information under the already-existing provision of Rule 16(d)(1),
so as to defer disclosure to a later time.").
329 An Advisory Committee member expressed concern about "so much variation nation-
wide" among different prosecutors regarding their discovery obligations. See Minutes, supra
note 116, at 6.
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give trial judges the authority they need to safeguard "both the rights of
the accused and the interests of the public in the administration of crimi-
nal justice."330
330 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR Ass'N, SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE § 6-1.1(a), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/trialjudge.html
#6-1.1.
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APPENDIX: LOCKE JURY INSTRUCTION
[ 1] Ladies and gentlemen, you are now going to hear the contin-
ued cross examination of Mr. Robert Locke. Mr. Locke's cross-exami-
nation will continue but only on the area of his special relationship with
the United States Attorney's Office and the prosecution team, including
federal agents. Before the examination continues I am going to explain
to you why the government will not be allowed to do redirect examina-
tion of Mr. Locke and why you can not consider any proof offered by
Mr. Locke in deciding any issue regarding Mr. Bettacchi. I will also
explain why you should consider any proof offered by Mr. Locke with
skepticism.
[1 2] The United States Attorney and the Department of Justice are
representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sover-
eign whose obligation to govern impartially is the source of its legiti-
macy to govern at all and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done.
The conduct of any criminal case has a defined process. The process is
governed by the United States Constitution, the laws enacted by the
United States Congress, and Rules of Criminal Procedure recommended
by the United States Supreme Court and adopted by the United States
Congress. Each case is also governed by various orders of the presiding
court setting forth a detailed procedural plan, and rulings on specific le-
gal issues that arise in the case.
[1 3] In this case, the Department of Justice and the United States
Attorney's Office have violated their constitutional obligations to the de-
fendants, they have violated the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and they have violated orders of the Court. The United States Supreme
Court has determined that when a defendant is on trial in the federal
court, prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to turn over to the de-
fendant evidence that is favorable to the accused either because it is ex-
culpatory or because it is impeaching, that is, the proof may provide
information that undermines the credibility of any witness called by the
prosecution in the case. The government and its agents cannot suppress
any such proof either willfully or inadvertently. The rules of criminal
procedure place an obligation on the government and its agents to pro-
duce certain kinds of evidence or proof if it is requested by the defend-
ants or ordered by the court. The suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused violates the due process of the law
where the evidence is material to the question of guilt, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Prosecutors have an affirma-
tive duty to comply with the Constitution, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the orders of the court. That duty includes the affirmative
responsibility to learn of any evidence favorable to the accused and to
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disclose such evidence in a timely manner so that it can be effectively
used by the accused. The government has violated its solemn obligation
and duty in this case by suppressing or withholding material proof perti-
nent to the credibility of Robert Locke. As a sanction for this inexcus-
able dereliction of duty the Court has entered an order that prohibits
consideration of any proof offered by Robert Locke in the case brought
against Robert Bettacchi.
[1 4] Thus, you may not consider testimony of Robert Locke when
you decide the charges pending against Robert Bettacchi. Locke's testi-
mony is stricken in its entirety as it relates to Robert Bettacchi.
[ 5] Having made this ruling the court does not mean to suggest
that you should give any more credence to Robert Locke's testimony as
to any of the other defendants. Indeed, you should examine Locke's en-
tire testimony with great skepticism and with greater caution than that of
other witnesses. In evaluating his testimony you should consider the bias
that he has displayed toward W.R. Grace, his relationship with the prose-
cution team and the extent to which those matters may have influenced
his testimony.
[ 16] You will have to decide what weight to give to Locke's testi-
mony if any but you should be very cautious about making a determina-
tion of criminal liability for any defendant based upon his proof.
[ 17] The issues I have described have been fully addressed by the
Court, and an adequate remedy is in place to allow the trial to move
forward. It remains your duty to give dispassionate consideration to the
proof in the record, within the confines of my instructions to you, and to
reach a verdict based on the facts before you and not on any other
ground. 331
331 Locke Jury Instruction, (Apr. 28, 2009, 5:06 PM), available at http://www.mtb.us-
courts.gov/mtdlimages/I 150.pdf.
